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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. PURPOSE AND PROBLEM OF THIS STUDY-- The problem of this 
thesis centers about Epistemology, or theory of knowledge. And yet, 
in this age of intense specialization epistemology has become too broad 
a field to attempt anything approaching an exhaustive treatment in so 
limited a space as that to which the study will be confined. And so the 
writer admits at the outset a need for confining the subject also. 
Professor Ewing describes epistemology as the field of philosophy 
which deals with such questions as--"How are we to define truth? What 
is the distinction between knowledge and belief? Can we ever know any-
thing with certainty? What are the relative functions of rea:s:oning, in-
tuition, and sense -experience? 111 And perhaps the entire field of logic 
could be placed under this category. 
In dealing with three men it would be impossible, obviously, to 
discuss all of the above phases of epistemology as delineated in their 
thought. In general the interest of this study will lie with the relative 
functions of reasoning, intuition, and sense-experience. The one essen-
tial question must be asked repeatedly: How is knowledge possible? In 
1. Ewing, FQP, 16. This and all other abbreviations are explained 
under the author's name in the bibliography. 
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asking this the door opens to a myriad of metaphysical possibilities. It 
will be necessary to clear the metaphysical ground in some instances 
before any intelligent discussion of the knowledge process can be under-
taken. An understanding of 'getting' is quite impossible until knowledge 
is acquired as to precisely what is the nature of the 'getter' and the 'gotten'. 
The precise problem then of this thesis will be to examine three 
epistemological theories under the prescribed limitations. It is expected 
that under investigation all three theories will reveal some questionable 
issues which will have to be criticized in light of internal consistency 
and coherence with knowledge on the subject as a whole. With the central 
question always in mind - -How is knowledge possible? --the three theories 
will be compared and contrasted in terms of their unique expressions of 
what might, in each instance, be called a realistic theory of knowledge. 
The purpose of this thesis is, therefore, aimed at discovering whether or 
not favorable comparisons are possible among three views which might, 
at first glance, appear widely divergent. The writer feels that the interest 
of philosophy and of life, which should in some respects at least, be iden-
tical, could better be served by minds in essential harmony than by discord . 
It is not the purpose of this study to force similarity and identity where 
it does not exist. No amount of wishful thinking can ever reconcile op-
posed views, but frequently the extent of opposition lies in a confusion of 
terms or ambiguity of meaning. In such instances a clarification of the 
3 
issues involved may well be profitable towards effecting some compati-
bility. The intent of the writer from this point on, and the goal toward 
which he is working, is to demonstrate that the three thinkers being 
considered are in for more essential agreement than is often supposed . 
He will also endeavor to bring into focus the exact issue over which there 
would continue to be disagreement if such an is sue remains. 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE--No published material has been discovered 
by the present writer with the precise problem of this thesis as content. 
Numerous scattered articles have appeared sporadically, principally in 
journals, giving attention to one or another phase of one or another of 
the principals of this study. 
The first thinker treated in the present discussion suffers from 
greatest paucity of critical examination. A number of reasons could 
be advanced. First, he is still living and developing his thought so that 
any criticism of John Wild would be a criticism of a mind in transition 
and would perhaps be non-applicable at a later date of consideration. 
Second, and more important, he is not endeavoring so much to intro-
duce a new and revolutionary system of metaphysics to shock the phil-
osophical consciousness as he is to express with adequacy and defend 
with finality the direct realism which has found historical expression 
in the writings of some of the grandest minds in philosophy. 
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Samuel Alexander has been under fire in several journals includ-
ing Mind, The Monist, The Philosophical Revie~, Philosophy and others. 
The only books dealing with Alexander exclusively are three: one by 
A. F. Liddell which serves more as an over-all criticism of the Space-
Time notion than as a specialized, the sis evaluating his theory of knowl-
edge, the second is a treatment of his nature of value undertaken by 
Milton Konvitz, the third gives considerable attention to· his religious 
philosophy and is entitled God and Space-Time, written by S. P. Stiernotte. 
While most reviews of Alexander's works have been unsympathetic, he 
has gained great respect as a systematizer of philosophical thought. 
Several even of his most severe critics would agree with C. F. Stout. 
"Though I cannot accept his conclusions, I am full of admiration for the 
comprehensive and systematic way in which he states the relevant questions. 111 
B. P. Bowne stands at the head of a tradition which has been re-
sponded to in philosophical circles with varied attitudes. A critcial review 
of personalism may carry betraying undertones of any sentiment from 
condescending disgust to awesome apotheosis. Neither attitude has any 
place in philosophy, but personalism has been often joined with religious 
interests and sometimes championed as a faith rather than a reasoned 
conclusion. If any aspect of Bowne's thought could escape this association 
and subsequent criticism, it would be his theory of knowledge. 
1. Stout, Art.(l940), 18. 
J 
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Few direct attacks of these viewpoints are extant, and those which 
do exist take the form of brief journal articles and reviews and one iln-
published doctoral dissertation from Boston University. Because of 
the general scarcity of critical material, the pre sent writer assumes 
the responsibility for any criticism not attributed to other sources 
throughout the text. Since each reference consulted is listed in the 
bibliography and each instance of indebtedness indicated by a footnote in 
the text, the writer sees no respectable purpose to be achieved by tedious 
listing of relevant articles here. Only let it be made clear that to the 
best of the writer's knowledge this particular type of comparative study 
of these three philosopher~ has never been undertaken prior to this writ-
ing. The extent of the writer's indebtedness to other sources will appear 
clearly in documentation. 
3. METHOD EMPLOYED--Philoosophy is famous for its disagreements, 
which have contributed not a little towards bringing it into disrepute as 
being unscientific, subjective or temperamental. Many reasons could 
be offered as explanatory of these disagreements. Certainly not least 
among the causes is the lack of precision and uniformity in the use of 
terminology. In this study three men will be classified as epistemological 
realists ; realists, that is, as concerns their conception of the cognitive 
relation. "Realism holds that things known may continue to exist 
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unaltered when they are not known, or that things may pass in and out 
of the cognitive relation without prejudice to their reality. nl The three 
thinkers under study will be seen to acquiesce tothis basic assertion, but 
with varying emphases. Even the naive approach to this undertaking 
would be able to detect differences. Differences exist, and, metaphy-
sically, would make these three thinkers totally incompatible, but this 
the sis will endeavor to reveal, at this point, not differences (which will 
be laid bare enough in discussion) but points of likeness, occasions of 
similarity without, wherever avoidable, undue presumption. 
The first subject for consideration is Professor John Wild of Har-
vard University. The present writer wishes to express his gratitude 
for the most happy privilege of personal consultation with Doctor Wild 
and for the helpful illumination shed upon his theory of knowledge through 
this medium. This fact, however, is not to be taken as endorsement by 
Mr. Wild of what is here presented to be his view. While the present 
writer feels assured that neither the letter nor the spirit of Wild's teach-
has been distorted in what follows, he would make clear that this 
paper was not reviewed by Professor Wild nor does it have his official 
approbation. 
Doctor Wild classes himself as a direct realist and is here des-
cribed under that distinction. Since he appears first in the study, a brief 
1. W. P. Montague in The Program and First Platform of Six Realists, 
quoted in Jarrett and McMurrin, (ed.T(:P, 126. ---
1 
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sketch is given in the section covering his thought of the development 
of realism historically. The purpose and function of Professor Wild's 
distinction between direct and other realisms should become increasingly 
more clear as his views are elaborated. 
With the consideration of Samuel Alexander (1859-1938) attention 
is turned to a theory of knowledge which is allegedly derivative from 
a metaphysics of prior importance. At least the postulates of this 
metaphysics must be given a hearing for an understanding of the basis 
for Alexander's otherwise abstruse knowledge relation. This approach 
is classified as naturalistic realism more for pragmatic than for de-
finitive purposes. Alexander could be classified a direct realist but, 
in the sense to which the meaning is here limited, Doctor Wild is the 
more representative of this classification. Naturalism refers to Alex-
ander's whole system, his metaphysical orientation, but epistemologically, 
the term. naturalistic realist distinguishes him for purposes of considera-
tion. 
Borden Parker Bowne was one of the most important American ex-
ponents of personal idealism. In popular expression idealism is often 
set in diametrical opposition to realism, and, as concerns ultimate meta-
physical views, this may be a valid distinction. For Bowne, however, the 
realistic epistemological tenets have some relevance despite his accusa-
tion that on the realistic view both thought and being are impossible. Here 
Bowne's system is called transcendental realism to designate what 
he might term "The Only True Monism". He states, "The dualism 
of the finite must be both founded and transcended in a monism of the 
. f' . Ill 1n 1n1te. 
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The plan of procedure in this thesis will be essentially one of inter-
nal criticism based first on a sympathetic exposition of the views of 
the three subjects under consideration. In this first exposition very 
little attempt will be made at negative criticism or evaluation in terms 
of coherence with experimental deductions. This type of criticism will 
be deferred until the final chapter, which summarily considers each view 
in terms of the coherence of the factors and relationships of the knowl-
edge situation. 
The individuals being examined will, in large, be allowed to speak 
for themselves. Caution has been employed to avoid permitting a rnis.:.. 
interpretation arising from the writer's bias or background to color the 
offering of another man's thought . This has necessitated, at seve!al 
points, rather lengthy quotations from original sources. This is not 
thought by the writer to be a hindrance but rather a benefit to lucid pre-
sentation. 
The method employed is meant to betray no design as to the eventual 
conclusions reached through thisstudy . In fact, no definitive conclusions 
1. Bowne, TTK, 311. 
should be expected. No view answers all the questions. Some may 
leave fewer unanswered than others; in which case it is desirable to 
9 
ascertain which one is more empirically coherent than the others. 
Nor do the three views presented within exhaust all thE; possibilities 
relative to epistemic theory, and the lack of consideration of alterna-
tive options should not be taken as indicative of the writer's opinion 
that they lack merit. Space dictates the terminal points. Perhaps 
most grieviously missing is C. D. Broad's realistic theory which de-
fends a doctrine of perceived sensa. The ramifications of this view, 
if elaborated, might provide an interesting meeting ground for Wild 
and Bowne, and perhaps more pertinently for Wild and Alexander. 
However, the spatial limitations referred to confine the treatment of 
the problem within the indicated limits. 
As has been cited and needs to be re-emphasized, not all the 
problems of the knowledge process, even for the three subjects treated, 
have been considered. The chief question, in fact the single, essential 
and elementary question which the writer would ask of the subjects here 
dealt with is--How is knowledge possible? How does the mind which is 
allegedly not its object know or get its object in consciousness? 
Turning now to the subjects of discussion and hearing their defence, 
the objective of the remainder of the study will be to evaluate their 
\) 
\ 
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systems critically in an endeavor to effect any possible reconcilia-
tion or to indicate points of tension which will own no coalescence with 
others. 
CHAPTER II 
THE REALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY OF JOHN WILD 
I. HISTORICAL AND INTRODUCTORY --The roots of realistic phil-
osophy can be detected weaving throughout the history of all thought, 
even back to Socrates, Plato and the ancient Greek thinkers. A more 
recent branch of the tree has found expression in the direct realism 
of John Wild, professor of philosophy in Harvard U niversity, who 
claims that his realistic philosophy "has been pursued and developed 
by great minds from the fifth c:entury B. C. in ancient Greece through-
out the whole of our western history down to the present time. 11 1 
Realistic philosophy has the appeal that it does not on the whole 
violate any basic insight of man's natural philosophy known as common 
sense. Three points of congruence between common sense and realis-
tic philosophy provide the latter with its doctrinal foundations. 
(1 )There is a world of real existence which men have 
not made or constructed; (2)this real existence can be 
known by the human mind; and (3)such knowledge is the 
only reliable guide to human conduct, individual and 
social. 2 
These three planks serve also as representative of the central di-
visions of philosophy. (l)The study of being (metaphysics); (2)the study 
1. Wild, IRP~ 5. 
2. Ibid., 6. 
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of knowledge (epistemology and logic); (3) the study of value (ethics). 
In this discussion interests will be limited to the second major division 
of psychology, or more directly, to the knowledge situation. 
Human knowledge is probably the most nebulous and intricate 
phenomenon of experience. In the field of epistemology realism at-
tempts first to describe the knowledge process accurately, 
then to explain it, and finally to defend it against those 
skeptical doubts concerning its ability to know things as 
they are which are constantly raised by the inquiring mind. 
Epistemology is the study of how, by means of concepts 
and other mental representations, we know extramental 
b . 1 o Jects. 
Formation of the realistic position regarding the knowledge situa-
tion has been historical and accumulative. Pointing backward it indi-
cates many sources which have made contributions to its final for-
mation- -yet each source, at its own level, could well be considered 
as a representation of epistemological realism. Plato contributed greatly 
to the understanding that faculties of sense and reason. are distinct and 
their functions are distinct. By sense we apprehend the ever fluctuating 
and relative; by reason we apprehend the permanent, the thing as it is in 
itself. 2 We gain this knowledge of the permanent by concepts or 'ideas', 
which are changeless, universal, and invisible; quite different from 
material existence which is fluctuating, individual, and visible. 3 These 
1. Ibid., 8. 
2. Phaedo, p. 79. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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concepts must be clearly grasped and combined and separated in accord 
with the necessary nature of things if we are to attain to truth. When 
their combination is merely according to sensory appearance with no 
reference to this necessity, the result is opinion and not necessarily 
truth. Knowledge, for Plato and certainly for any devoted seeker after 
it, is born in the knower's yearning for necessity, and when this neces-
sity is attained, must be true. Fale knowledge is impossible · the terms 
are mutually exclusive. 
From Aristotle realism received fruther impetus in that thinker's 
unification and development of many of Plato's later epistemological 
tendencies. He forced the logical conclusion to Plato 1 s doctrine of 
ideas and explained that the immaterial faculty of reason is able to 
identify itself with the forms of material existents, while being dis-
tinct from their matter. The geologist in knowing the stone may exper-
ience a conscious identification with the form of the stone, may, in a 
manner of speaking, become the stone without becoming physically 
petrified, enlarged, reduced, or otherwise altered. Here Aristotle 
is the first to claim that knowledge gives a new mode of being to things 
which makes them noetically present before the mind. Through this 
analysis Aristotle and subsequent realists explain knowledge without re-
course to a world of universal essences apart from the natural world. 
14 
These concepts are the individual and material forms of natural ob-
jects which exist in the mind as universal and immaterial. 
Through historical development these essential realistic tenets 
have undergone some slight variation. The camp has frequently di-
vided in deference to a particular emphasis or modification; however, 
these mentioned sources may properly be considered to form the back-
ground of the realistic thinking of Professor Wild. His own episterna-
logical theory is called 'direct realism'· "By direct realism I refer 
to a theory which holds that the human cognitive faculties are able to 
know entities distinct from themselves as they really are at least in 
1 . 
part. 11 Here we have briefly, and succinctly stated, the cardinal tenet 
of this realistic epistemology and the thesis for which all that follows 
will be elaboration and clarification. 
Probably no one is more acutely aware of the necessity for es-
tablishing precisely what one intends to convey than is Professor Wild. 
Especially has the field of epistemology become clouded with misunder-
standing so that classification into schools has come to mean everything 
and nothing. If it means anything to be a realist it means something 
which differentiates this way of conceiving knowledge relation from 
other ways. 
What is it to be an epistemological realist? It is to hold 
the view that the mind can actually know some reality. I 
1. Wild, Art. (1953), 143. 
doubt if ordinary usage would ~ enable us to go any 
further than this. But who then is not a realist? Is 
there any idealist, or, in fa~t, anyone at all, who would 
deny this proposition? 11 1 
Wild is not willing, however, to settle upon so ambiguous an under-
standing but insists that; 
To be a realist, it is not enough to hold that something 
is real. In this sense e v eryone is a realist. Realism is 
the philosophy of reality , based necessarily on the all-
em bracing concept of bei ng, and the strict empiricism 
which this alone makes possible ..• in spite of idealism, 
being (ens} is distinct from being-before-the-mind (ens 
rationis). Z 
Investigation must first turn upon the nature of the knowing sub-
ject of the cognitive relationship. Finding him to be composed of a 
psyche and its faculties, next consideration will be given to the ele-
ments apd processes of rational cognition. 
Man is an evolved natural entity or substance existing in him self 
and supporting faculties and accidents of various kinds. ''Since that 
out of which an entity has developed remains within the entity, though 
under a new form, the existent human individual has a composite hylo-
morphic nature. " 3 The term hylomorphic is used by Wild as by other 
realists to denote that man (with all natural entities) has emerged in an 
/ 
evolutionary process and therefore includes in his nature a matter (hyle) 
1. Wild, Art. (1947), 152. 
2. Wild, Art. {1947}, 152. 
3. Wild, IRP, 395. 
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from which he has evolved, and a form (morphe) which gives him de-
terminate structure marking him off from other species. Man is, on 
the one hand, the prepared matter which is capable only of being man; 
and on the other, he is the soul or psyche which distinguishes him in 
form from all other entities by rationality. 
Because of this distinct duality of body and soul or psyche, we 
are left three alternative views of man. First, emphasis may be 
placed upon the formed body as the only essential part, and rationality 
dismissed as an accident, thus being materialistic in our evaluation 
of man. Second, we may concentrate solely upon the differentiating 
form, rationality, which separates man from all other creatures, dis-
missing the material body as accident, thus becoming spiritualistic 
or idealistic in the extreme. 
Both these views have won marked attention and many adherents 
but neither is a happy solution for Wild. The report of common sense, 
though not worked through with precision and detail affords us a more 
meaningful clue. This report has been refined in realistic thought 
since the time of Aristotle and teaches us that man is a hylomorphic 
being having two essential parts: an organized material body, and a 
rational life which animates it. These are not two independent factors 
joined in an accidental unity; they are interdependent constitutive prin-
17 
ciples of one thing. Justice could hardly be done to Wild•s theory 
without a careful analysis of the Aristotelian distinction between form 
and· matter, first and second cause and a host of further incidental 
relationships. Space curtails greatly the length at which this investi-
gation is free to give careful consideration to these implications of 
Aristotelian thought; however, pains must be taken to avoid confusion 
regarding the exact nature of Wild •s differentiation among body, fa-
culties, and psyche. 
We must conclude that the psyche which continues to 
animate the body as long as it lives, must be distin-
guished from the five major faculties of human life, 
lP.utrition, locomotion, senso.!l awareness, rational 
apprehension, various appetit~ none of which is always 
active and some of which may be lost without the cessa-
tion of life. 1 
The human psyche is what lends to the underlying matter its hu-
man nature or determinate structure. Wild warns against conceiving 
of two separately existing substances, f o r man is clearly not two but 
one, single, material entity, constituted by two recognizable but in-
divisible parts: matter (the body) and form (the psyche). Just as mat-
ter cannot exist without form so here body would, by itself, be mere 
indeterminate potency requiring the specific determination of form sup-
plied by psyche. In the evolutionary journey of man from natural matter 
1. Wild, IRP, 405. 
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He has arrived at a human nature, an immediate fusion of matter and 
form which are always in some relation. 
Any thinker has the right to be considered on his own ground; how-
ever, it is impossible to cover all the ground which a fair treatment 
of Wild's position would necessitate. Mention should be made, at least, 
of two cautions which he would make against a misinterpretation. These 
are enumerated in the form of assumptions which Wild considers to be 
1 
fallacious to cogent reasoning. 
The first error often indulged by voluntaristic philosophy has 
been the belief that it is unnece s :sary to distinguish between the psyche 
and its various acts, holding that the sould is its feeling, thinking, and 
desiring. That is to say a man is what he does and literally makes 
him self by his varied acts. This view is false for at least two reasons: 
(1) If it were true, all man's acts would be essential to him and he could 
not rightly be denoted a man when not thinking, willing, desiring, etc. 
He would not be a man, for instance, when asleeep (2) If it were true 
it would logically follow that with the experience of a new sensation or 
thought a man changed essentially. Wild would allow for change while 
holding to identity with the assertion that man perfects himself but does 
not make himself. 2 
1. For greater insight and elaboration of this too sketch listing see 
Wild, IRP, 392-409 
2. Wild, IRP, 404. 
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A second alternative would be in agreeing with Ockham and his 
followers that the psyche, though distinct from its acts, immediately 
produces its accidents, feeling, desiring, willing, thinking, etc.~ 
without faculty mediation. This argument would insist that the psyche 
itself as such is able to perform these different acts. This view is 
subject to two difficulties; (1) If the psyche flowed into its varied acts 
it would become a capacity of thinking, feeling, etc. But the power to 
sense etc. is defined by its act or end so that if the psyche were immed-
iately capable of its acts, as this view holds, it would be specified for-
mally by nutritive and sensible objects outside itself. (2) The psyche 
can lose a whole faculty, as sight for example, and maintain itself as 
h . . 11 . 1 w at 1t essentla y 1s. 
When Wild speaks of faculties he has in mind the following defi-
nition. 
The quality in an entity which makes it capable of per-
forming certain acts even when these acts are . not actually 
performed is a faculty . Thus a man who is not blind 
has the faculty of sight even when his eyes are closed. 
The faculties of a natural entity are usually necessary 
accidents caused by the substantial form or nature, which 
is always in act as long as the entity exists. 2 
Wild lists five major faculties with various subdivisions. 3 That these 
faculties are universal indicates that they have their first source in human 
1. Loc cit. 
2. Ibid., 501. 
3. Cf. above, p. 11, and IRP, 405. 
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nature itself, "the substantial form of the individual man." 1 This form 
which is one remains always in act so long as the individual is living. 
The active tendencies however are distinct from each other, and are 
not necessarily always in act. "This suggests that the proximate source 
of each tendency is a certain faculty or power, a necessary accident 
of the human psyche. •• 2 
The above abbreviated presentation of Wild's doctrine of the 
psyche is admittedly inadequate to render meaningful his entire concep-
tion, but it is hoped that it suggests with sufficient clarity for its need 
in this context the essence of the realistic interpretation of the psyche 
as related to the primary nature of man and to his faculties. 
2. THE GENERAL NATURE OF COGNITION--The next logical concern 
is with the business of the mind which is to know. Knowledge or cogni-
tion may be defined for our purposes as "the act by which one being may 
unite itself with another being from which it is materially or existentially 
distinct. ,.3 According to Wild we are aware that cognition is partly phy-
sical and partly immaterial, being conditioned in the first instan~e by 
physical organs and changes, and involving in the second the essence of 
sensation, the cognitive aspect :itself. 
1. Wild, IRP, 403. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Ibid., 500. 
'd-\. 
tion. 
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Sensing is a kind of awareness or cognition. Having 
one's eye colored blue is not to be aware of blue. Hav-
ing one's head vibrate is not to sense sound. The physi-
cal presence of something in something physical is not 
knowledge, though it may condition knowledge. So we 
must ask first of all what cognition or awareness is. Cer-
tainless it is some kind of presence. But what kind. 1 
The answer is noetic presence or noetic identity or assimila-
This is the key which unlocks the mystery of both sensory and 
rational cognition and absolves us from the epistemic dilemma accord-
ing to Wild. But the word and claim apart from their definition and 
demonstration would be as arid as a less pretentious boast. Noetic 
identity must be pregnant with explanatory and satisfactory content. 
An examination of what occurs in an instance of physical change on a 
sub-cognitive level may furnish a clue to the understand ng of this 
term and Wild's solution to the difficulties. In each instance of physi-
cal change--
l. We have formed matter (for example, cold) which is capable 
of assimilating an opposite form (for example, heat). In the process 
the form cold is eliminated and the new form heat assimilated. 
2. The matter does not become the form but combines with it in 
a third substance which is a union of the two. 
l. Wild, IRP, 408. 
2 2 
3. The form of the matter is not the form of the cause. It 
is, in fact, numerically distinct from it. 
In the light of this process of physical change the knowledge pro-
cess will now be examined with the intention of discovering where it 
differs from or approximates the process of physical change. 
1. In sensory experience it is not necessary that ari opposite 
form be destroyed for the assimilation of the sensed form. For in-
stance, one must not of necessity feel cold before one can feel warm 
nor see red before seeing green. The sense faculty while requiring 
some physical cause, is immaterial and can communicate among any 
of the forms within its range without the prior destruction of an op-
posite. 
2. The cognitive faculty is not a sort of matter able to receive 
physical impressions from a new form in the manner that the hand is 
impressed by the heat of the fire, for example. Were this, in fact, the 
case we should never know anything except that which resulted as a third 
thing from the union of the form with the matter of the faculty of mind. 
"But so far as we know, we do not make any~· material entity, but 
assimilate the form or nature of the thing exactly as it is. This shows 
that noetic assimilation cannot be physical reception of an impression. "l 
1. Wild, IRP, 409. 
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3. The known object cannot be considered the exclusive ef-
ficient cause of the knowledge situation. A physical cause, as we 
have seen, can only produce something similar in an alien physical 
matter. But in knowing, for instance the heat of the fire, I must as-
similate something that is identical with the heat outside my mind, but 
identical not existentially, rather formally or structurally. Knowing 
something similar to the heat only, I should never know the heat it-
self, and could not step outside my mind for a confirmation of the simi-
larity. Thus in the sensing process "there is no longer any formal dis-
tinction between the sense quality which is acting and the sense being acted 
upon, as in physical change. ,,l As Aristotle pointed out, while recog-
nizing that what can sound and what can hear are two distinct entities, 
"the actual sounding of the sound and the actual hearing of the sound 
are one actuality. 112 
Here Wild has e'stablished that noetic presence is not physical 
presence nor subjective inherence, but neither is knowledge of an ob-
ject reducible to being physically influenced by the object, else should 
all physical things be capable of knowledge. Realism posits rather the 
existence of an immaterial mode of presence by which the knowing fac-
ulty makes an external object noetic ally pre sent before mind, by an im-
material species. "The physical impression by which we receive a 
1. Wild, IRP, 409. 
2. :Pe Anima, 426A 15. 
physical influence has a definite size, and shape, and position. But 
the noetic impression by which we know is an immaterial species, 
representing the form of something other than itself." 1 
3. RELATION OF SENSORY TO RATIONAL COGNITION--It has been 
stressed that sensory cognition is similar to rational cognition, is in 
fact a rudimentary type of human cognition involving both a physical 
and a noetic assimilation bound together in one. Wild enumerates five 
factors which constitute the structure of sensation. 
1. Some quality which is able to produce a like physical effect 
on a transmitting medium which makes contact with the sense organ. 
2. The actual transmission by the medium of the physical species 
to the organ. 
3. The abstraction from its matter of the forril by the sense faculty 
of the organ. 
4. The sensible species so abstracted (examples of abstracted 
species would be the sound high C, color green, sweet taste, etc.). 
5. The material object which is made immaterially known, or 
b h . . 2 present, y t lS specles. 
When any of the above factors are absent we have no real sensory 
1. Wild, IRP, 410. 
2 • Wild, IRP, 413 - 14. 
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awareness on Wild's view. Sensation essentially and necessarily involves 
all five factors. There must be first a quality physically inhering in an 
external object as for example heat inhering in a steam pipe. In the 
second place this quality must be physically transmitted and impressed 
upon the sense organ, as heat energy impresses the nerve endings. Next 
the tactual sense organs must be able to abstract the form of the impre s- · 
sion from its matter, inasmuch as the nerves are not only physically 
affected by the warmth, but also assimilate what we call the heat, with-
out assimilating anything material, existing externally or any heat waves 
or vibrations. Fourth, there is the sensible species, or form of heat 
itself, distinct from any physical changes or waves. This sensible species 
is that )>y which we feel the external warm pipe, for this form which is 
not materialized is formally identical with the heat of the pipe. It is not 
merely a supposedly similar representation. Finally there is, accord-
ing to Wild's view of sensory cognition, the object which is felt by this 
species, the pipe qua warm. 1 
Wild would have us see in the above illustration that the relation be-
tween the activated sense organ and its object is more than one of mere 
similarity. Were it not it would be impossible to distinguish sensing 
from being materially changed, since any matter assimilates a similar 
1. Wild, IRP, 415 illustrates by similar analogy. 
form in being changed. The relation is rather an example of the pecu-
liar noetic relation of identity. Wild quotes Aristotle as saying 11the 
activity of the sensible object and that of the percipient sense is one and 
1 
the same activity 11 • 
While sensory cognition is a type of and related to rational cog-
nition, there are nonetheless differences obtaining between them. Mere 
accumulation of sensations will not necessarily eventuate in the acquisi-
tion of understanding. There is a distinguishing mark of the higher 
mode of apprehension which Wild calls immateriality. 
Forms existing in matter are spread out quantitatively, 
individuated, and subject to quantitative change. This 
is called material existence. 
Certain forms can be given existence without first 
entering into such a corn bination with matte r . They 
are neither quantitative, individual, nor subject to 
quantitative change. Such existence is called irnrna-
terial. 2 
Common sense reports that reflective or immaterial cognition is 
not subjected to the severe limitations of sensory cognition. Human 
thoughts are not limited to determinate objects. Anything whatever can 
be made the object of reflection. Sense must have, at least, some rna-
terial quality before it is able to function. As the example portrays and 
as any experience of sensation would support, sense is restricted to 
1. De Anima II, 425B, 27. 
2. Wild, IRP, 503. 
27 
odors, flavors, colors, temperature changes, all qualities which 
are always apprehended under certain material conditions. On the 
other hand, human thoughts or ideas are not so limited. I do notre-
ceive through any sense the humanity of my friend · I cannot touch, see 
or smell it, and yet it is apprehended by mental activity. Matter is 
not being itself but only a certain mode of being which exists under 
particular quantitative conditions and not others .. 
A faculty like sense, which can be actualized only by 
material influences, has a limited range of apprehen-
sion. For instance, no sense can clearly apprehend 
itself. But the faculty of reason can apprehend being, 
under which everything whatsoever , whether it be sen-
sible or insensible, must fall. 1 
In addition to the limitation to determinate objects, sense is further 
hampered in that it cannot achieve the universal. In sense I am aware 
of this long, black, and red shape moving in my hand at this moment. 
In imagination and memory I am likewise bound to a particular object 
or occasion. Sense is bound to forms which are able to physically af-
feet a material medium . Mind, on the other hand, can apprehend the 
universal, necessary nature of, for instance, a pen . That is to say, men-
tal cognition tells me what a thing must be at any particular time and 
place in order to be a pen. To alter the figure, this particular rose is 
1. Wild, IRP, 442 . 
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a sensible object, but mind invades the sanctuary of the universal 
meaning, the necessary nature of this and all roses--into roseness. 
These distinctions point to the existence and operation of a 
faculty free from the restrictions to material conditions imposed upon 
sense, and seemingly unlimited in scope. This higher faculty and its 
distinguishing mark of im.materiality must be scrutinized more closely, 
and examined in respect to the precise nature of its relationships with 
the world of materiality. This will be done in the next section. 
As has been previously intimated, knowledge, properly defined, 
is for Wild knowledge of something precisely as it is formally; is, in 
fact, an identification between what is in the object and what is in the 
mind. 11 The faculty of reason infallibly apprehends being universally 
as it is in itself ••• the object of knowledge is universal and stable. 111 
Now Wild is led to ask: "But how are we to understand such a faculty? 
Precisely what does it apprehend? How does it operate? How are these 
immaterial operations related to material things in nature? n 2 These 
are the questions which cry for attention in any theory of knowledge, 
and their answers establish or repudiate the credibility of the theory 
as a whole. 
1. Wild, PTM, 270, At this point Wild has to face the problem of error. 
This problem lies outside the scope of this thesis; but at least some indi-
cation should be made that he treats the problem. Error occurs on the 
level of sense and falls into two major classifications: 11 (1) those with 
physical causes (sensory errors) and {2) those with psychic causes (per-
ceptual errors)." (IRP, 432). 
2. Wild, IRP, 447-48. 
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4. THE OBJECT AND PROCESS OF KNOWLEDGE--Forms of objects 
may be obtained by two modes of reception. The first is the material 
assimilation of the transitive, physical influences as when a stone re-
c..eives the heat of the oven or the artist's canvass receives the color 
painted upon its surface. In this subjective mode of reception the form 
retains no independence for itself but becomes fully integrated with the 
receiving object. In the second or immaterial mode there is no subjec-
tive integration of the form with the material recipient. That is to say, 
in knowledge or the knowing process the form is received objectively 
precisely as it is in the external thing, holding its own independence 
and distinction. 
Reason, as a noetic faculty, holds a formal object before itself. 
Man's unique function is enacted when he bestows this peculiar cogni-
tive mode of being upon things in the material world. 1 But reason is 
a cognitive faculty distinct from sense, which is also a cognitive faculty 
on its own level, hence intelligence must have a formal object distinct 
from the sensory object. Our question centers yet about the precise 
nature of this formal object. 
l. Wild makes alm.ost this very statement, "This distinctive function 
of man is precisely to be stow this p eculiar, cognitive mode of being 
upon the material things of nature . " (p. 448 ffiP), which seems to be 
an unfortunate phrasing rather than a concession to Bowne. 
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Sense cannot abstract the formal structure in nature from its 
material constituents. This is the function and power of reason, to 
free the formal nature from everything that would materially restrict 
it to a particular instance, and hold it before mind in its "naked uni-
versality". Wild states: 
The basic fallacy lies in a failure to see that sense and 
reason are distinct faculties, each with a distinct object 
of its ~· Rational cognition cannot be explained unless 
it actually apprehends some object distinct from that of 
sense. 1 . 
The object of reason, whatever it is, is located exactly where 
the object of sense is found, as something implicit in the material 
object, either as the essence of the thing or of one of its accidents. 
In the case of knowing an orange, for instance, in sensory cognition 
the composite material whole is apprehended, not the orange itself 
or the yellowness as such, but the concrete confusion of yellow orange 
with its accidents and properties. However, the object of reason, on 
the other hand is "materially the same but formally distinct. That is, 
what I understand by reason is precisely the essence of this concrete, 
sensible object. 112 This would be in the case of the orange, the very 
orange itself or its property of yellowness as such, with everything 
extraneous or irrelevant omitted. In other words, reason apprehends 
1. Wild, IRP, 452. 
2. Loc. cit. 
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the same material substance which is the object of sense, but grasps 
a formal structure in the thing which is not available to sense since 
sense is limited to cognition of the individual and particular concrete 
manifold. Reason grasps the very Ding an Sich abstractly with nothing 
added or detracted save what is irrelevant and hence not the thing. 
Having concluded that mind has for its object the formal reality 
of the natural world, and that mind understands by universal concepts, 
consideration must now be given to the elaborate process and exact na-
ture of the universalizing activity inherent in every knowledge situation. · 
The problem of the universal, its causes and relations has been much 
alive in the evolution of western thought. Wild considers and rejects 
the solutions proposed by nominalism, extreme realism, and idealism. 
These positions must regretfully be denied any lengthy hearing in order 
to pursue more directly Professor Wild's own proposed answer with 
the hope that some light will be shed upon these alternative options 
through their relationship to his the sis. 1 
The realist agrees with what he feels to be of worth in the above-
mentioned theories but aims to avoid what he considers the catastrophic 
consequences which result from uncritical acceptance of them. He 
would agree at certain points which we shall list below. 
1. For a definitive statement of nominalism, cf. Berkeley, Principles 
of Human Knowledge; extreme realism, cf. Montague, W. P., Ways of 
- -Knowing; for conceptualism, cf. Lewis, C. I., Mind and the World Order. 
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1. He finds no fault with the contention that all outside the cogni-
tive faculty is individual and material as emphasized in nominalism, but 
maintains the existence of universals in the mind. 
2. Nor would he argue with the extreme realist in his insistence 
that knowledge is not a mental constru·et and has a foundation in extra-
mental being, but he would balk at the identification of this foundation with 
anything universal or mental. 
3. He could consent to the conceptualistic emphasis upon the 
activity of mind rather than a passivity in the knowing process, but 
would refuse to attribute the power of molding or creating a new object 
to this mental activity. He would contend for the abstractive activity 
of mind in divorcing all irrelevant materiality from the formal nature 
of objects and holding this formal universal before consciousness. 
Any material existent may properly be an object for mind's ab-
stractive activity. · The view given by sensory cognition is not false 
but confused and fluid, a material rather than a distinct, stable, formal 
view. Rea&on, in abstracting the formal element from its material 
confusion, lays bare what has been termed 'the absolute nature 1 of a 
thing. The absolute nature as such is not an individual nor a universal 
11 it is what Plato called the pure idea, all alone by itself {auto kath auto), 
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in a state of utter solitude, apart from everything not contained in it 
essentially. 111 It is the function of the understanding to bring this 
solitary nature or neutral entity before the mind and present it non-
physically and intellectually. 
Since this presentation is neither an individual nor a universal 
we might well ask what allows emergence of the universal in thought. 
The universal, for Wild, is a relation having its foundation in the ab-
solute nature, brought into a state of solitude by the mind, and com-
pared with the concrete individual whence it has been abstracted. When 
this absolute nature is, in comparison, seen to be present in these and 
an indefinite number of possible individuals it is then a universal con-
cept. It is clear to see that the absolute nature serves as a link for 
noetic identity, existing outside the mind materially, and inside im-
materially. As an example of how .this absolute nature serves as a 
connection, Wild states: 
When I predicate man of Socrates, Plato, and an indefinite 
"class" of men, I do this by setting up a relation of uni-
versality in my mind. But what I predicate of Socrates 
and so on is not this mental relation but the absolute na-
ture man which is perfectly capable of existing outside 
the mind with further individual determinations. 2. 
The whole of cognitive experience is a process and since process 
cannot conceivably be held to originate out of nothing we posit first of 
1. Wild, IRP, 459. 
2. Wild, IRP, 460. 
all a possible intellect, that is an indeterminate capacity which at 
first knows nothing but is capable of knowing all things. 11The pos-
sible intellect ... is absolutely unrestricted. It is able to apprehend 
being itself, and therefore all forms whatsoever, even the forms of 
immaterial entities, like reason and its immaterial acts. 111 This 
latent potency might never achieve actualization were not some moti-
vation provided for the indeterminate possible intellect. This is sup-
plied, however, inthe active intellect. The active intellect is, for 
Wild, 11like a light, ever actively shining and ready to illuminate any 
object brought within its range, elucidating whatever is intelligible 
and 'impressing' its absolute nature, or 'intelligible species', on the 
possible reason. n2 
Care must be taken against confusing the operation of this active 
intelligence with the creative or reconstitutive activity of some idealistic 
views. The activity of which Wild speaks in no sense remolds external 
matter or reconstructs it to what it is not in itself. Ever active, it illu-
minates and brings into abstract intelligibility that which sense trans-
ports within its range. Now for the sake of clarity, the process will be broken 
into its constitutive operations as they reveal objects of knowledge to 
the possible intellect. 
1. Wild, IRP, 461. 
2. Wild, IRP, 461. 
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l. Sense offers the forms and qualities of things, clustered 
about and in the matter, which can act efficiently upon the material 
organs of sense, but are not able to affect directly the immaterial pos-
sible intellect. 
2. Imagination is able to re-order the clustered sensory offerings, 
and so differentiate and prepare them that reason is afforded an object 
suitable for illumination. 
3. The active reason here abstracts a certain nature from the 
object, divorces it from all irrelevant determinations and impresses it 
upon the possible intellect. 
4. The possible intellect, once it has been impressed with these 
absolute natures, is able to cqrnpare and contrast them with one another. 
Utilizing sense and imagination it can further compare them with their 
own individual entities, and detect universal relations of identity be-
tween abstracted natures or forms and concrete individuals. 
Thus by judgment and reasoning, it may analyze a con-
crete entity into all its intelligible components and corn -
bine these together precisely as they are combined in 
the thing itself. These processes are those by which 
we know reality, and make it immaterially present before 
the mind precisely as ~ is. 1 
l. Wild, IRP, 462, italics mine. 
5 . SUMMARY--On Wild's view to know means to know something 
exactly as it is formally, apart from knowledge. Mere similarity 
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will not suffice if knowledge is to be meaningful, there must be identity 
between what is in the mind and what is in the object. Knowledge in 
the true sense is impossible on any view which stops short of this. That 
this may be and often is questioned Wild admits. Why must there be 
an insistence upon identity, suppose we know not the object as. it is but 
only a similar thing, do we not even yet partly know the object, and is not 
this an adequate, even veridical, accounting of what knowledge truly is? 
It is not an adequate view Wild would answer, for at least two 
reasons: (1) to know nothing as it really is is to have nothing beyond 
my idea with which to compare my idea to determine that there is a 
similarity, (2) how can I know my idea as it really is if a mental act 
can never be identified with anything other than itself? I shall not 
be able to know my idea but only something similar, and yet not this 
but only something similar. No knowledge would ever be po.ssible, 
claims Wild. 1 
Aware of the obvious fallacy which may be grasped at by his op-
position, Wild further argues that if we can know an idea by perfect 
identification, then what ground have we for denying knowledge of external 
1. Wild, IRP, 446. 
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things in the same way. Such knowledge involves identity, a mode of 
assimilation through which no new, composite entity is formed . Such 
a non-composite assimilation would of nee essity be non-physical or 
immaterial in nature. 
It has been indicated that in sense also there is immaterial assimi-
lation since sense is a genuine form of cognition . But even so sense is 
severely limited by material conditions. Sensation on Wild's view is 
psycho-physical in character, involving a physical and an immaterial, 
abstractive, efficient cal,!Se. In contrast the higher, apprehensive psyche 
is completely and unhinderedly immaterial, and therefore is in need of 
no specific physical organ. That it does not is clearly evidenced in that 
we feel no intensity or strain in any organ when confronted with intensely 
knowable objects . In sense we are blinded by intense light and deafened 
by terrific sounds, for example, but there is no purely mental cognitive 
correlative. 
6. CONCLUDING ANALOGY- -Professor Wild finds a helpful analogy 
to elucidate his view of the cognitive process in the figure of photo-
graphic procedure . In photographic art the various phases are related 
in a manner not dissimilar to the relation of the phases of knowing even 
though the elements of photography are all physical and mater i al in 
character . 
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The flash camera apparatus operates in a darkened room where 
the shapes and patterns of objects are obs.cure, just as the forms of 
objects of reason are hazed in the vague indeterminacy of matter. Just 
as the flash illuminates the obscure scene, so the active .reason lights 
a concrete image or sensory scene. The shapes and patterns which 
have always been inherent in the objects, though not seen, are now made 
distinct and clear at once and impressed on the film by the light. After 
like manner the active reason clarifies the forms and natures actually 
inherent in material things, but not understood because of their en-
tanglement with indeterminate matter, and impresses them on the pos-
sible intellect. 
The geometrical figure impressed on the film is in a sense. dis-
tinct from the geometrical shape of the object filmed. One shape resides 
in the camera while the othe_r is in the matter of the object. However, 
the two figures are formally similar {not identical). Likewise the species 
impressa in mind is in a sense distinct from the inherent nature of the 
material object. One is in tnind, the other in material object. Wild 
would insist nonetheless that the two forms, while existing in two dif-
ferent substances in two different ways, are formally identical. 
Next comes the elaborate process of developing the film, touch-
ing the print and completing the panoramic picture. This process is 
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accomplished in a darkroom remote from the original object. Various 
chemical processes are utilized which have nO; 'Z'elationship to the ori-
gin al object. The marvel is t h at the finished picture may well be an 
accurate replica of the object. In logical reflection Wild sees a cor-
responding process. The ideas which have been impressed upon onr 
minds are developed into clear definitions and combined into true judg-
ments about the entire nature of the complex object. Peculiar logical 
processes are involved in this which have no relationship to the original 
object and it all occurs in .the mind, remote from the object. 
Yet the fully developed species expressa and judgment 
may be a formally identical replica of the thing it-
self. By these logical processes true knowledge is at-
tained, not of the processes, but of the very thing it-
self. 1 
Wild further extends this fruitful analogy to indicate the points of 
failing in opposed views. The extreme realists and neo-realists for 
example are guilty of an absurdity analogous to that which, in the para-
digm, would sup pose that the chemicals used to develop the picture of 
a horse for instance were inherent in the horse. Idealists and concep-
tualists on the other hand who claim universals exist only in the m ind 
with no foundation in reality err as would the photographer who became 
so obsessed with the development of the film that he was blind to the 
1. Wild, IRP, 465. 
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importance of the original exposure and insisted that all of photography 
lay in the darkroom. In such an idealistic or creative view of photography 
the very purpose of photography is contradicted by a failure to recognize 
that this purpose is not to make a new thing or unfold an object already 
in the camera, bar rather to assimilate a geometrical pattern of an ex-
ternal archetype. 
As in photography, so in knowledge, the change is not in the object 
but in mind (camera). The picture taken is relative to its archetype and 
not the archetype to the picture. So knowing is an assimilation of a form 
without its matter. Change occurs in the mind, not in the thing. The 
object exists exactly as it is whether it is being known or no.t in much 
the same sense as the horse remains the same whether having its pic-
ture taken or not. Thus Wild elaborates his concept of the noetic as-
similation and identity in the knowing process. l · 
1. The analogy is found in IRP, 464-67, and is here presented in greatly 
abbreviated form. The essential argument speaks clearly however and 
in the opinion of the present writer is most persuasive. 
CHAPTER III 
THE NATURALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY OF SAMUEL ALEXANDER 
l. INTRODUCTORY --Samuel Alexander denies epistemology a place 
of privilege in his system. In fact, he has displayed disapproval when 
others have attempted to exalt it. 
I have felt something approaching irritation when my first 
volume which is fundamental, has been passed over with 
a word ••• and exclusive attention directed to the theory of 
knowledge which I expressly declare to be derivative. 
One could perhaps question the validity of Professor Alexander's dec-
laration but for pqrposes of this investigation it is of little consequence 
whether his theory of knowledge is primary or derivative. This does 
not however remove the responsibility of noting, at least, the meta-
physical presuppositions which make his particular epistemological 
orientation possible. One is led to believe that Alexander's really 
essential postulates can be enumerated in something less than two 
volumes however. His claim to a primary interest in metaphysics is 
undoubtedly sincere although he makes the admission that it was in 
dealing with theory of knowledge that he was led on to ontological 
questions--and being led on he formulated one of the grand systems 
of metaphysics in British thought. It is not the particular task of this 
thesis to substantiate what Alexander claims in his metaphysics. It 
l. Alexander, Art. {1921), 414. 
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will be enough if, by culling and paraphrasing, sufficient of his cen-
tral assertion is presented to indicate just how his theory of knowledge 
might be derivative. 
The central hypothesis of his Gifford Lectures and, indeed, of 
his entire philosophy is that Space-Time is the stuff of which matter 
and all things are specifications. Space and time have no existence 
apart from each other. Space-Time is the source of the categories, 
the pervasive non-empirical characteristics of existent things, which 
these things possess because of certain fundamental features of any piece 
of Space-Time. These fundamental features cannot be defined. For to 
definite is to explain the nature of a thing in terms of other and in general 
simpler things, themselves existents. 1 But there is nothing simpler than 
Space- Time, and nothing be side it to which it might be compared by 
way of agreement or contrast . The utmost that we can do therefore is 
to describe it in terms of what is itself the creation of S-T. 2 S-T itself 
and all its features are revealed to us "direct as red or sweet are. 11 We 
attempt to describe what is only to be accepted as something given, 
which we may feel or apprehend, that is to describe the indescribable. 
S- T does not exist but is itself the totality of all existence. 3 Ex-
istence may properly be attributed to that which occupies a space -time. 
1. Alexander, STD, I, 336. 
2. This abbreviation, used by Alexander himself, will follow and mean 
always Space-Time. 
3. Alexander, STD, I, 337. 
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The world as S-T never and nowhere came into existence for the in-
finite becoming cannot begin to become. S-T is not a unity of many 
things neither is it a one, for that implies that it could descend into 
the realm of number, become merely an individual and be compared 
as one with two or three. 1 The universe is, in this sense, neither one 
nor many. Accordingly it is only describable not as one and even less 
as a one, but as the ~ and only then because the quasi numerical 
adjective serves to designate not so much one's number as its infinite 
singularity. 2 Yet it is not so much an individual or a singular as 
the one and only matrix of generation, to which no rival is possible 
because rivalry itself is fashioned within the same matrix. 
In truthS-Tis not the substance of substances, rather it is the stuff 
of substances. 3 No word approximates its meaning more closely than the 
ancient one of hyle. Just as a role of cloth is the stuff of which coats 
are made while it is not itself a coat, so S-T is the stuff of which all 
existents are made whether as substances or under any category. The 
stuff of the world is self-contained in that there is nothing not included 
in it but it is not the supreme individual or person or spirit, but rather 
that in which supreme individuality or personality is engendered. 4 S- T, 
the universe in its primordial form has no 'quality' save that of being 
spatia-temporal or motion. All the wealth of qualities which makes 
l. Alexander, STD, I, 339. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3 . Ibid, 341. 
4. Alexander, STD, I, 341. 
things precious to us belongs to existents which grow within the matrix. 
It is greater than all existent finities or infinities because it is their 
parent. But as pureS-T it lacks their wealth of qualities, and being 
elementary is so far less than they are. S-T is not in space or time 
as though there were an enveloping space or time. It is itself the whole 
of spaces and times. But it must not therefore be supposed to be space-
less or timeless. 
Call it by what you will, universe or God or the One. There is 
only one Space and one Time. The only eternity which can be construed 
in terms of experience is infinite time. S-T is neither in time nor in 
space · but it is time and it is space- -and from this bare confusion called 
pure motion emerge all the world of existents of whatever nature and 
quality. 1 Throughout his exposition Alexander attributes characteristics 
to this bare complex which do not appear to be provided for in the _primordial 
motion, but this is however a question beyond the limits of our immediate 
2 
concern. 
Since all finite existents have emerged from the basic stuff S- T 
so we find the history of mind is traced ultimately to this matrix. 
Mind is in fact the highest order of finite empirical existent, but while 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 45-73. 
2. The above two paragraphs pretend to be no exhaustive portrayal of 
Alexanderis grand system, but as excerpts of pertinent passages they 
should furnish insight into the unique starting point of his thought. For 
the whole account see STD. 
epistemology assumes no place of privilege in metaphysics, so mind 
is afforded no creative role of superiority in the realm of existences. 
"Minds are but the most gifted members known to us in a democracy 
of th~ngs. In respect of being or reality all existences are on an equal 
footing. "1 Alexander decides to examine the vc;trious categorial features 
of existence in sequence and exhibit the proper place of mind in rela-
tionship to other finite empirical existences. This occupation he faith-
fully pursues in his major work Space, Time, and Deity. This same 
procedure the present study is of course, barred from and this limita-
tion will be rather severely felt. Nonetheless care will be taken to 
extract his theory of knowledge in such a manner as to guard against 
violating the categorial frame of reference from which it is deriv*tive. 
Throughout the remainder of this chapter attention will be confined to 
the definition of three Alexandrian concepts: (1) The nature of mind as 
such, (2) the cognitive relation, and (3) the various ways of knowing. 
2. THE NATURE OF MIND--Alexander follows rather closely the 
thinking of C. L. Morgan and G. E. Moore in his view of mind as a 
quality of a certain sort of nervous organization, in a certain condition 
of functioning. 
1. Alexander , STD, I, 6. 
The substance mind is the complex of mental processes 
contained within its proper contour of space -time. The 
mental processes ~identical with their equivalent 
neural processes and are these processes as enjoyed 1 
or lived through. 
The nature of mind in its relationship to the body proves a more 
available and analyzable problem for Professor Alexander than does 
the relation of lower qualities to their inferior basis; hence he searches 
this higher analogy for a clue to even the interpretation of lower levels 
of existence. 
My mind is somewhere within my body, .or within my 
head, or when I have acquired knowledge about my 
central nervous system it is for me recognized as being 
in the ~ place as that system or more specifically 
as the brain or some part of it. In this way I localize 
my mind in space by recognizing it as occupying the 
same place as some physical object. 2 
This identification of mind with body and particularly of mental pro-
cesses with physiological ones is no mere matter of theory for Alex-
ander, but rather is a deduction from empirical experience. 
We learn by experience, helped out of course by re-
flexion on it, that mind and body are not two things 
but one .•. We can of course distinguish the conscious 
characters ••. from the mere physiological. .. ones. But 
the mental process is not a separate existence from the 
physiological one but the same; and except for the dis-
tinguishing character of consciousness the other features 
of the neurosis are carried up into the psychosis. 3 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 38n. 
2. Ibid,, I, 101. 
3. Alexander, Art. (1912), 9-10. 
We are not permitted to stop at a mere correlation of mental and 
neural process but must go beyond to identification of them. Hence 
we are compelled on Alexander's view to accept as empirical fact the 
conclusion that a neural complexity at a certain level possesses con-
sciousness, and the converse that a mental process is likewise at least 
a vital process. 
For mind to be properly an emergent from vital complexes it 
must possess a distinctive characteristic which is not found on the 
lower level of life; but because of Alexander's claim that it is an 
emergent grounded in the lower level of existence, he must show that 
mind is both temporal and spatial. Professor Alexander recog-
nizes this need for proving that space and time are 'carried up' into 
the new emergent quality mind or consciousness, and he endeavors to 
establish mental acts as spatia-temporal. "Consciousness is admitted 
to be temporal; and I completed my view when I could see that mentality 
occured along certain spatial lines. ,J 
Mental space is the space in which the mind experiences itself 
1. . 2 as 1v1ng its direction qua functioning. Alexander acknowledges 
that the view which .holds mind as enjoying itself spatially is often met 
with direct and even contemptuous opposition . His affirmation is that 
mind as spatial is enjoyed in space and that "this enjoyed space is at 
any instant occupied not merely by the mind's present but also by its 
1. Alexander, STD, I, xv. 
2. Alexander, STD, I, 93. 
enjoyed past and future. "l Part of the repugnance with which the 
view is met has a moral basis; it appears to many to imply materialism. 
To this Alexander answers quite unashamedly that if inquiry forced a 
materialistic conclusion to his seeking he would have to be a materialist, 
however, this is neither his predetermined intent nor a necessary de-
duction. In fact, "if mind is spatial like matter, Space is as much in 
affinity with mind as it is with matter, and the fear of materialism is 
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groundless." Another objection to his claim arises from what he 
would call a mistaken belief that a spatial mind has to be apprehended 
like a spatial physical object. This might be so if mind had been as-
serted to enjoy itself in contemplated space. The assertion is however 
that mind enjoys itself in enjoyed space. 
My mind is for me, that is for itself, spread out or vol-
uminous in its enjoyment. Within this vague extension 
or volume the separate and salient mental acts or pro-
cesses stand out as having position, and 'direction'. 3 
A difficulty in Alexander's rendering of the spatia-temporal char-
acter of mind may be detected here. He insists upon an absolute pres-
ent as opposed to mere succession. 4 There is no experience of a tern-
porally extended present; past, present and future are compresent . Here, 
if he can be interpreted as meaning all awareness to be only a mathe-
matical pre sent, he must plead guilty to a violation of his own empiricism. 
1. Alexander, STD, I, 93. 
2 . Ibid . , 9 7 . 
3. Loc. cit. 
4. Alexander, STD, I, 116. 
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He is emphasizing the intransitive nature of experience, but fails to 
distinguish among experiencing time, clock time, and real time. If 
our experienced times were congruent with clock time we should need 
no clock time. There is an elastic nature to experienced time which 
must be accounted for. 
In his definition of mental space as "the space in which the mind 
experiences itself as living or which it enjoys", l Alexander could mean 
two quite different things. By the "mind enjoying space" he might mean 
the mind perceives spatially, the act is extensive in reference or form, 
which most would agree with (even Kant). Or he may mean enjoyment 
is itself spatially extended, that the act is not merely extensive but ex-
tended. Of cour:se when he locates and makes perceiving co-terminus 
with the nervous system he asserts both. Mind and brain interact in the 
sense that neuro-conscious processes produce other neuro-conscious 
processes. Consciousness is in fact the enjoyed (or lived through) in-
nervation of the appropriate neural process. That which is mental pro-
cess is always identified, by Alexander, with a neural process in the 
cognitive relation. 
Mental events and bodily events are .• ~ realized to belong 
to one place and .•. to one time. Mind and body are exper-
ientially one thing, not two altagether separate things, be-
cause they occupy the same extension and places as a part 
of the body. 2 
1. Alexander, STD, I, 93. 
2. Ibid, 107. 
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The statement of Alexander's claim cannot however be con~ 
verted. In this Alexander shares very nearly the view of Bosanquet. 
Thus while Alexander writes "While all psychoses are neuroses, the 
psychoses imply the emergence of a new feature, that of mind", Bos-
anquet says something similar: "The fertile point of view lies in taking 
some neuroses (not all) as only complete in themselves by passing into 
a degree of psychosis. rrl The fact of emergence guarantees that novelty 
will be present on the conscious level. Alexander refers to a word 
used by Mill in explaining this development. 
Mind requires, as a fact of experience, a collocation of 
conditions which constitutes something new .•• I take it 
that in the main what determines the difference of the 
psychical from the merely physiological process is its 
locality in the nervous system, implying ••• the special 
c structure of the living nervous elements in that locality. 2 
Thus, Alexander concludes that mind is an emergent from the 
singular matrix S-T in a certain state of complexity. 
Out of certain physiological conditions nature has framed 
a new quality mind, which is therefore not itself physiologi-
cal, though it lives and moves and has its being in physio-
logical conditions ••• It is in this sense that mind and mental 
process are vital but not merely vital. 3 
3. THE COGNITIVE RELATION---The simplest and at the same time 
most universal relation am-ong existents is that they are connected 
1. Bosanquet, VDI, 3. 
2. Alexander, STD, II, 6. 
3. Ibid. , 8. 
together within the one $pace .. Time. Whether they are successive 
qr concomitant their togetherness is defined by a term suggested by 
Alexander as 'compresence 1 • Compresence holds of all existents. The 
sun and my pen, Napoleon and the square root of two are all compres-
ent. "Compresent means simply belonging to ~he same universe. 111 
The cognitive relation is an example of compresence. There pre-
vails a universal temptation to think that it must indeed be a unique 
relation of compresence else should all physical things 1know 1 each 
other. Alexander goes to some length of explanation in order to refute 
the notion of uncritical thought to which so many have subscribed. As-
cribing uniqueness to the knowing relation, he would have us _understand, 
represents a failure to see that the relation is merely one of compresence 
which relation obtains among all finite existents, hence is assuredly 
not unique. 2 If there is any uniqueness it belongs not to the relation 
but to one of the terms. For a relation of compresence to becom.e a 
cognitive relation one of the terms must be the highest level of empiri-
cal existent, must be mind or mental process with the unique character 
of consciousness. When there is a conscious term in the relation, we 
have a knowledge situation. 3 
In order to clarify further the status of the simple relation let 
us remove the mental process and examine the relation on lower ·levels. 
1. Alexander, Art. (1912}, 3. 
2. Alexander, STD, II, 81-82. 
3. Ibid, 82. 
We shall substitute for the mental process first a non-conscious, liv-
ing term such as a plant. The togetherness of the living plant and at-
mosphere is not conscious but a vital action of respiration. Substi-
tute now a rubber ball for the plant, and a hand which c;ompresses 
and releases it for the atmosphere, and we see that the togetherness 
is neither conscious nor vital but only elasticity of a material object. 
In each proposed instance the unique factor was contributed not by the 
relation obtaining between the two terms, according to Alexander, but 
rather by one of the terms at a certain level of development. "So far 
as consciousness is a unique property of certain things, the relation 
of knowing an object is unique. 111 But life, color, elasticity, etc. are 
also unique properties characteristic of certain types of existence; we 
conclude then that--
the relation of togetherness between knowing subject and known 
object, so far from being unique, is the most general and 
most elementary of all relations ••• we have this relation 
wherever in the world there is connectedness, and this is 
the elementary condition of there being one world. 2 
Whether we consider perception, or images, or thoughts, judg-
ments, or whatever, in each case there are two things together. Our 
mental prepossessions cause us to think that what we apprehend must 
be dependent upon our mind somehow. Alexander would have us strip 
our minds of all such prepossessions and see that to have an experience 
1. Alexander, Art.{l912}, 317. 
2. Loc. cit. 
means precisely the compresence of the two terms named mind and 
object. When I perceive a table I am aware only of the table. 
Thus the table and I are together in precisely the same 
sense as the table and the chair are together ••• Any ex-
perience whatever means therefore compresence within -
the world of the experiencer and the experienced in pre-
cisely the same way as two experienced things are to-
gether for the same experiencer. 1 
The relation of togetherness, when subsisting between an em-
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pirical thing with the character of consciousness and any object being 
contemplated, is a cognitive relation. The identical relation occurs 
however wherever there are finite individuals in the world. ''Between 
any two individuals whatever the r e subsists a relation such that the 
one may be said to 'know' the other. 112 This is of course a wider em-
ployment of 'knowing 1 in which not only would mind 'know 1 things, but 
life could 'know' material things, and one physical thing could 'know' 
another; in fact, everything A could 'know' ·_ -•Nyt hing else B and enjoy 
itself. The particular nature of A would determine how much and in 
what shape B was revealed to it. "A only knows an aspect L of B if A 
first of all can be stirred to an activity appropriate to the revelation of 
L, and, secondly, if it actually is so stirred, by whatever means. "3 
It is not to be supposed that Alexander is purposely destroying the 
actual cognitive relation by analogical usage of the expression 'know' 
1. Alexander, Art. {1912}, 3. 
2. Alexander, Art. {1912), 318. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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on inferior levels of existents. This was done merely to illustrate 
the basic fallacy of ascribing to the relation any quality of uniqueness. 
Alexander would insist that not every existent is a mind, neither can 
all existents 'know' when know is meant literally. In the strict sense 
there is no knowing unless one of the terms is mind or a mental pro-
cess. It is only in descriptive analogy that mind is so emptied of its 
distinctive property of consciousness as to be applied where conscious-
ness is not known to exist. "The fundamental relation of togetherness 
is that of subject and object and ••• this is knowing when the subject is 
a mind. "l 
Knowing then, the most interesting of all relations, interesting 
because of one of its terms, occurs when the subject, a mental process, 
contemplates the object of cognition. This is contemplation and not 
enjoyment for on Alexander's terms enjoyment is clearly not a rela-
tion but a state of mind. 2 The subject in cognition i s stirred by some 
means or other into consciousness of a certain 'direction• and finds it-
self in the presence of an object, not itself, appropriate to that condi-
tion of consciousness. In every case of cognition of an object we find 
the compresence of two things, the subject or mental process in an 
1. Alexander, Art. (1912), 319. 
2. These terms •enjoy' and 1t;:ontemplate 1 are to be defined presently. 
The essence of this paragraph is clear without knowledge of their techni-
cal meaning. 
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apprehensive condition, and the object revealed to the extent to which 
it is apprehended. "The relation is thus the whole situation constituted 
by the togetherness of these two things, so far as it connects them. 11 1 
We may be tempted to ask with Professor Stout why, since every-
thing is compresent with everything else, being all part of one spatial-
temporal universe, are we not omniscient, seeing that mental process 
is com pre sent with all else? 2 Alexander admits that we do not appre-
hend all things as objects of knowledge. He admits further that we ap-
prehend but a small portion, namely, those with which we are so together 
that we are in an appropriate act of consciousness. The rest we do not 
know in the way of conscious knowledge. But our body apprehends some 
of them in so far as it lives, and others in so far as it is merely rna-
terial. While it is true that every finite is compresent with all other 
finites it does not always happen that a finite A, for example, is com-
present with a percipient finite B in respect of the distinctive character 
of B. The object A can only be considered compresent with a mind B 
as it can evoke an act of B as such, or corresponds in some way to an act 
of B. 3 When an article is behind my back, though not in mind it is none-
theless compresent with me as I am a body or, at very least, as we are 
both portions of S-T. But should I have a reason to imagine it or think 
l. Alexander, Art. (1912), 316. 
2. Stout, Art. (1940), 2. 
3. Alexander, STD, II, 99. 
of it behind my back, it becomes compresent with my mind. "Mind is 
selective {like any other finite) in the sense that it singles out for its 
special reference the object it is compresent with. 111 
It should prove profitable to ask two further questions of Alexander 
before leaving the cognitive relation to investigate the functions of 
mind. The first question depends partly for its answer upon the inves-
tigation of enjoyment, contemplation and assurance which is to follow 
this section, but the question will, at least, afford us an appropriate 
bridge for passage into a more detailed study of these functions. The 
question is: How is this relation of togetherness of mind and its objects 
experienced? When Alexander lists as components of perception the 
subject, object, and relation obtaining between them he does not 
mean to suggest that there is a relation of and or together over and 
above the terms. 2 This would be to abstract the relation from its 
terms and contemplate it by itself which is impossible since the rela-
tion is the total situation which constitutes experience. 
The contemplated object is the object revealing or show-
ing iself, the enjoyed thing is the mind apprehending, and 
the total situation is what may be called either the exper-
iencing of the object, or the object's being experienced, ac-
cording as the situation is viewed from the side of either 
term of it. 3 
1. Ibid, 100. 
2. Alexander, Art, (1912), 319-20. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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The nature of this contemplated object constitutes the subject 
matter of the second question. As we have seen, the object, in fact 
all objects are finite empirical existents, certain complexes of S-T, 
whatever else they may be. But for the cognitive situation certain 
misconceptions as to the function of objects of knowledge must be 
purged. 
A distinction is drawn by Alexander between objects which are 
the finite existents revealed to mind in any of its acts and those group-
ings of objects within a particular spatia-temporal contour which are 
known as things. A thing is de sdribed "as the space -time which exhib-
its at any moment and from moment to moment different features united 
in a substantial unity.'' 1 These partial features are selected by mind 
according to certain circumstances. This selection is not necessarily 
an active one in the sense of purposively operative, but it is however 
to be distinguished from mere passive acceptance or affection. The 
thing which is partially revealed in its objects has the same kind of ex-
istence as the objects themselves whether these things be of sense or 
memory or thinking or imagination. 
In the act of knowing the mind refers to its object as some-
thing non-mental, and it may and does refer to that object 
as part of a larger whole which is also included under the 
general name of object. 2 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 92. 
2. Ibid., 94. 
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Thus there is no thing residing behind the objects which reveal it as 
a thing-in-itself; if the object revealed is physical, so is the thing. 
The things which the mind contemplates then are contemplated selec-
tively as partial objects. The thing is revealed in its object identically 
with its true existence, that is sensa or sensory appearances are of 
the same kind of existence as the objects themselves. Objects of mind 
are dependent upon mind for nothing more than their selection; their 
~they have as finite existences in S-T. 1 
A t hing is a portion of S-T with a specific configuration of motions. 
The thing is discovered by the mind as the synthesis of its various ap-
pearances. This ?ynthesis is characteristic of the thing and is in no 
sense the work of mind. The sensa, percepta, images, memories, 
thoughts, etc. a~e partial objects which in their synthesis constitute 
the thing. 2 None of the various appearances of the thing is mental, not 
even illusory appearances which are illusory only in so far as they are 
supposed to belong to the real thing of which they seem to be · appearances. 
In itself an illusory appearance is a real, or as much an object as a 
real appearance; the illusion consists in an erroneous reference of it to 
where it does not, in fact, belong. 3 As Professor Stout summarizes 
Alexander's teaching on this matter we believe the core of his meaning 
is made explicit. 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 95. 
2. Ibid., 183. 
3 . Ibid. , 18 6 • 
His general doctrine is that ••. what we perceive as ex-
isting actually does exist. Illusion is due to selection 
from, or distortion of, what actually exists as physical 
fact ••• The difference between the object as it really is 
and as it is perceived is constituted by the partial nature 
of the perception. Only part of the object appears: but 
the part that does appear, appears as it really is. 1 
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4. ENJOYMENT CONTEMPLATION AND ASSURANCE--Mind enjoys 
itself, contemplates its objects, and is assured of other minds. These 
are the activities and functions to which mind is inextricably bound. 
Never will a mind contemplate itself, or enjoy its objects or other minds, 
nor will it be assured of itself or objects. There is one arrangement 
of these three activities of mind, and analogically these activities are 
pe r vasive in the scheme of all things. "I propose to say that the mind 
is enjoyed and its objects contemplated ••• or ••• the mind is lived through 
and objects are cognised. 112 Also, on the level of life, for Alexander, 
living things enjoy life and contemplate mere physical things. Could 
we penetrate into the nature of pieces of matter, we might discover that 
each has a distinctive existence and contemplates other pieces of matter. 
In the other direction, an angel would enjoy its own angelic existence 
and contemplate our minds much as we contemplate physical things. 
"Whenever then a new order of beings emerges, those beings enjoy their 
1. StOl.lt, Art. (1940}, 9. 
2. Alexander, Art. (1912}, 4. 
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own peculiar existences, each his own, but they contemplate every-
thing lower than themselves. "l Idealism, in supposingphysical things 
to be at bottom :i:nind, overlooks this fundamental difference of mind 
and things expressed in the terminology that one is enjoyed and the other 
contemplated. 
A. Enjoyment--"The act of mind is an enjoyment. 112 This is the best 
word Professor Alexander could find, but he admits that it is not par-
ticularly felicitous. In its meaning must be included suffering or any 
other state or process which the mind lives through. Enjoyment does 
not stand in contrast to qnderstanding; as when Wordsworth speaks of 
the poet as "Contented if he but enjoy the things which others understand." 
On the contrary enjoyments are understandable and analyzable. "The 
description and analysis of enjoyments constitute what is known as in-
trospection. " 3 
This distinction between enjoyment and contemplation is expresstble 
in terms of the difference between cognate and objective accusative. "I 
am aware of my awareness as I strike a stroke or wave a farewell. My 
awareness and my being aware of it~ identical. I experience the tree 
as I strike a man or wave a flag. 114 Since enjoyment is the act of mind 
1. Loc. cit. 3. Alexander, Art. (1911), 241. 
2. Alexander, STD, I, 12. 4. Alexander, STD, I, 11-12, my italics. 
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in contemplation of an object it would appear that an enjoyment is a 
mental act pure and simple. But were this the case Alexander could 
not speak so freely as he does of our enjoyment of enjoyments or of our-
selves. We are not merely one of our mental acts although we may be 
and presumably are complexes composed of enjoyments. Hence we 
could be said to experience an act in the sense in which we stril;ce a 
blow, but experience an object in the sense in which we strike a bell. 
A seeming ambiguity arises when Alexander speaks as if to enjoy were 
to know and in some instances to know things which are not acts of mind. 
It appears to be claimed that we can know objects of contemplation by 
enjoyment while we cannot contemplate our mind or its states. The 
difficulties are conceived by Professor Broad to rest in the basic ques-
tion "Is enjoyment by a mind a mode of knowledge or only a mode of 
being. " 1 
The brief summary question of Mr. Broad's difficulties is met 
with a brief summary answer by Professor Alexander. 
It is undoubtedly a mode of being, but not only a mode 
of being, for it is that kind of be'ing which is a know-
ing, and is at once a knowing of objects (in virtue of 
which relation it is called contemplation), and of itself. 2 
This demands an exposition. 
1. Broad, Art. (1921}, 129. 
2. Alexander, Art. (1921), 420. 
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While enjoyment is a mode of being, its essence is to be a know-
ing, a knowing of its object and an awareness of itself. The first 'of' 
means a referring to and apprehension relative to the object, but the 
second 'of' means consisting in, so that enjoyment is awareness consist-
ing in itself. If we distinguish knowledge from knowing, knowledge then 
has to do with existences, some of which are physical and others 'natural' 
objects. Sorre existences are acts of knowing, that is a knowing of objects 
and consisting in themselves which is the only way the knowing can be 
known. Alexander does not speak of knowing by enjoyment for he would 
be compelled to add the proviso that this is not a knowing of the enjoyment. 
To simplify matters Alexander explains that he arrived at the notion of en-
joyment in the first instance by thinking about causality. 
Asking how a thing could be the cause of the mental state 
which apprehended it, and observing that we were una-
ware of the neural effect which it actually produced, I con-
cluded that the presentation of the object was not as it were 
a mental picture produced by the thing in my mind, but was 
the thing itself or a selection from it, and that the mental 
process was an 'act' of mind which I lived through. 1 
In his thinking Alexander conceived the nature of this enjoyment to be 
analogous to an animal's or plant's selective reaction to stimuli. Men-
tal responses are in the line of organic reactions but not merely vital 
having tre emergent quality of consciousness. 
1. Ibid. , 421. 
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Professor Broad deduces that Alexander must admit mind to be 
spatio-temporal, to which charge Alexander readily surrenders. 
Mind is spatio-temporal or the entire theory is invalidated. Hence it 
is as possible for mind to enjoy its space and time as it is for it to be, 
and in fact its being is, in a sense, contingent upon such enjoyment. 
c) 
The knowledge implied by enjoyment should be understood always to 
be knowledge suitable to enjoyment as with space and time . Alexander 
says that in contemplating a horse the togetherness of mind and horse . 
is not contemplated but enjoyed, that is the togetherness of the self 
with the horse is lived through as a character of mind ' s enjoyment. 
From the horse's point of view he would experience it as a character 
of his enjoyment. "In other words the togetherness is not contemplated 
by me . . . W hen I see the horse what I see is the horse · that is the whole 
. 1 ObJect." The togetherness is there in the situation and as such is at-
tached to the enjoyment and not the contemplated . To say we could con-
template the object as together with our enjoyment would involve two er-
rors: (1} it would mean contemplating one's self and (2} experiencing 
the relation twi ce. The first error is obvious, the second mean's only 
that we should have to experience the relation from both its terms which 
is of course impossible . We contemplate objects o n lower levels from 
1. Ibid . , 422 . 
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our transcendent position, and an angel would view our mental act and 
its object with contemplation, but we do not contemplate the situation 
in which we are involved- -only one of its terms, the object. When 
asked how the cognitive relation is experienced on the human level 
Alexander would answer that it is enjoyed and is exhausted in the enjoy-
ment. 
B. Contemplation--Enough has been said to indicate the fact that con-
templation is related to but not identical with enjoyment. In contempla-
tion the mind is related to external things. Alexander describes this 
relation as "mental act" or as "conscious response to some non-mental 
existent". 1 As an action or response he treats contemplation as a form 
of conation. Mental action in the first place is something mental, not 
merely physiological. By action Alexander does not mean merely the 
"special activity which is felt in certain mental processes or acts, like 
desire or endeavor or willing. 112 On the contrary, mental action "in this 
usage .•. includes passive acts of sense as well as activities of volition. "3 
Conation is, in fact, the kind of conation which issues in the movements 
•sustaining our attention• to an object. This cognition which is a conation 
is also a synonym for attention in Ward 1s meaning of the expression. 4 
1. 
3. 
4. 
Alexander, STD, II, 117. 2 • Ibid. , 118. 
Lac. cit. 
Alexander cites Ward, J. Psychological Principles, iii. 
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Contemplation is the relating of external objects to the mind, as 
has been indicated, but never can mind contemplate itself. The possi-
bility of introspection might appear to falsify this claim by assuming 
that in introspection the mind is turned upon itself and makes itself an 
object of contemplation. In truth however what happens when we are 
engaged in introspection is very different. "Introspection is in fact 
merely experiencing our mental state, just as in observation of exter-
nal things the object is contemplated. 111 That is the experience itself 
is enjoyed while whatever the object may be is contemplated. Intra-
spection is enjoyment by the mind of itself; contemplation is always ex-
trospection. 2 
We conclude then that in any cognitive relation there is a mind 
which enjoys itself while it contemplates an object other than itself. 
There is an enjoyment with every contemplation and vice versa; the 
enjoyment is the very living through of mind while it contemplates its 
object. 
Alexander holds that there is a way of apprehending, which he 
calls intuition, under the general heading of contemplation but distinct 
from sense perception. The reader will recall that Alexander's ontology 
posits a real spatial-temporal universe, existing independently of being 
perceived. Our knowledge of this universe is primarily direct in the 
sense in which 'direct 1 is contrasted with 'inferential'. Through in-
1. Alexander, STD, I, 18. 
2. Cf. ibid., I, 17, II, 89 ff. 
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tu:ition we apprehend pure space-time. Intuition is radically distinct 
from sense perception but nonetheless dependent upon it. That is 
apart from sense perception intuition would be a mere faculty. The 
actual exercise of the faculty is indispensably conditioned by the per-
ception of qualities. This condition imposes, besides, a saving limita-
tion. Since in com presence we are part of one space -time, intuition 
if it could be delivered of the limiting condition of sense experience, 
would know all other compresent parts of S-T in all their detail. Even 
with the limitation of intuition imposed by sense perception Alexander 
claims we are cognizant not indeed of the whole of S- T but of S- T as a 
. 1 
whole. 
Intuition as awareness is a form simpler than sensation, yet an-
terior to sensation and different from reason, 11 ••• but reason and sense 
are outgrowths from it, empirical determinations of it. 112 Intuition is 
not more direct than sensation or thought, the only difference is in the 
relation of objects which are thus brought together. 
There are several instances in which intuition is most aptly given. 
The first is that of the coincidence of the enjoyment of the date together 
with the duration of a mental event and the contemplation of the external time 
together with the duration of the object. 3 A second instance is an extensio~ 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 200-201. 
2. Ibid., 147. 
3. Ibid., 144, 151. 
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of the first in that Space-Time and the categories are intuited. However 
in both cases mind is the same. As Alexander says, "Our mind is always 
substantial even in a single act, and it is also substantial as a whole. ,,l 
Thus far Alexander has discovered intuition as the apprehension of 
an existent and a subsistent. What are we to say of appearances? Ap-
pearances are "not objects of sense at all, but of intuition. 112 But he fur-
ther insists "we apprehend spatial characters by intuition. 113 That is, 
Alexander saves himself from contradition by holding that we intuit only 
primary qualities, not in any form of themselves, but as related to the 
secondary qualities. 4 Intuitions are affected by whatever affects the per-
ception. This is the necessary deliverance of having our intuitions of 
Space- Time aroused by sense. 
Curiously enough Alexander does not say that we have an intuition 
of Deity. The 'religious sense 1 is distinct, crude and primitive in corn-
parison with the reflect ive definition of religion as faith in deity seen in 
the line of value. 
The explanation of the relation of mind and mind applies to the relation 
of mind and deity. We are assured of the existence of other minds through 
the social emotion, and of deity through the religious emotion. But this 
leads directly into the next section and a survey of that medium of cogni-
tion known as assurance. 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 151. 3. Ibid., 200. 
2. Ibid., 192. 4. Ibid., 160. 
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C. Assurance--Besides the contemplation of external things and the 
enjoyment of ourselves we have, . Alexander teaches, a third form of 
experience, the "as:surance", or acknowledgement of other minds. 
Alexander nowhere carefully distinguishes assurance from contempla-
tion and enjoyment, and but little stress has been laid upon this novel 
cognitive act. But Alexander unequivocally teaches that we "have direct 
experience of the existence of minds in others. ,,l This is an "original 
fundamental awareness" 2 of minds not our own; and he suggests that, 
It may be doubted whether the inner life of the subject 
would be attended to for its own sake were it not that in 
the intercourse with other persons ••• we are thrown 
back upon ourselves ••• and we become definitely aware 
of ourselves as subjects of experience. 3 
This direct experience of other minds is not derived from contem-
plation nor from enjoyment :Out from social emotion. "We can enjoy 
only our own mind and not the mind of another", and we do not contem-
plate the mind of another "as if it were an external object." Thus I am 
not aware of a person's mind as I am of his body. "Yet experience as-
sures me that he has a mind. " 4 What sort of mind the other person has 
I can only divine on the basis of analogy with the mind I enjoy. But the 
assurance that there is a mind is not invented by inference of~ analogy, 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 37. 3. Ibid., I, 105. 
2. I bid., 36. 4. Ibid., II, 37. 
69 
it "is an act of faith forced on us by a peculiar sort of experience. ~,l 
Alexander cites Bishop Berkeley's affirmation that we know God 
by the same sort of evidence as we know each other as partly indicating 
his own position. ''The world of nature is the external sign, the divine 
visual language, by which we know God's mind, as we know each other's 
minds by their gestures. 112 Berkeley was only so far right as to recog-
nize that the relation between our knowing of other minds and of deity 
is in the fact that both knowings go beyond sight. What Berkeley did 
not perceive was that ultimately whether in sensation or faith the objects 
of cognition are discovered to us by our mental response to them. There 
is also a marked difference between our apprehension of other minds 
and of deity, which is not a mind only but a higher emergent quality. 'We 
are assured of other minds through the social emotion, and of deity 
through a different response, the religious emotion. " 3 In each case 
there is a response specific to the discovered object but in neither case 
is the object enjoyed or contemplated; its apprehension is something cor-
responding to assurance, or faith. "Faith in other minds may be called 
practical assurance. Faith in God we may ••. describe simply as faith. 114 
Our assurance of other minds is possible because we are social beings, 
but the satisfaction of the social instinct depends upon reciprocal action 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 37. 3. Loc. cit. 
2. Ibid., 380. 4. Loc. cit. 
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on the part of others. We experience no such reciprocal action from 
God, rather the response is in the strength and sustainment the universe 
gives to our minds in its tendency to deity. 1 Our faith in God approxi-
mates the nature of simple sensation more closely than does our assur-
ance of other minds. Nevertheless "the assurance of the reality of God 
we cannot call surer than our assurance of each other's minds: both 
are equally sure, but it is simpler. 112 
There is another difference between faith in God and assurance of 
other minds concerning the speculative ability of mind free from emotion. 
Without experience of the social emotion we should never, says Alexan-
der, be able to invent speculatively the idea of a mind other than the one 
we enjoy--another mind similar to our own. It is true that the notion 
of God comes also through emotion, and is only subsequently speculated 
about and 'stated in relationship to the object. Nevertheless, Alexander 
insists, we should be able speculatively, without the practical revelation 
of God, to arrive at the notion of the world moving toward deity, although 
we should not on this basis assume it to be worshipful. 3 "Thus", he con-
eludes, "we are sure of other minds only on the ground of specific ex-
perience; we are assured of God's reality on the ground both of specific 
experience and speculative evidence, derived from experience itself. " 4 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 380. 3. Ibid.,381. 
2. Ibid., 384. 4. Alexander, STD, II, 381. 
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5. SUMMARY --It has been indicated that, on Alexander's theory, knowl-
edge is not the essential concern of metaphysics, but only an important 
chapter in it. It is to this chapter that greatest attention has been given 
in this study. Mind was found to be in dynamic relation to the living or-
ganism which it occupies and from which it emerges. Rather than unique, 
in the strict sense of that term, the cognitive relation is but an out stand-
ing instance of a relation which can be appropriately expressed on any 
level of emergence. On his theory Alexander finds no discontinuity be-
tween mind and body in that mental process is also neural process in an 
all em bracing inter -relationship of the organism as a whole. 
In mind's activity there are three main types of experience, each 
distinguished by the nature of that which is experienced. These forms 
of cognitive experience are, first, contemplation of external things, fur-
ther described as activity of mind, second, assurance of other minds 
and of God; and finally, enjoyment of one's own mind, in its contempla-
t . d . t 1 1on, assurance, an enJoymen . 
1. For this summary arrangement I am indebted toM. Calkins, Art. (1923), 
206. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM OF BORDEN PARKER BOWNE 
1. INFLUENCES- -Borden Parker Bowne is considered by many to be 
the "American founder and popularizer of Personalism. "l The forma-
tive influences upon Bowne were primarily the most outstanding thinkers 
in the history of philosophy before him. Most influential in his develop-
ment were Berkeley, Kant and Lotze to which fact Bowne gave overt 
admission by referring to his philosophical doctrine as "Ka.ntianized 
Berkeleianismt'. 2 But Bowne developed his thinking in an era when 
it would have been most diffieult for him to avoid falling prey to the 
groping tentacles of Pragmatism. Several writers have noted the def-
inite dualistic interplay in his thinking between the rationalistic thought 
exemplified in the classical heritage of philosophy and the indigenous 
American philosophy of pragmatism. 
Bowne's literary lifetime spanned thirty-nine years beginning in 
1872. There is a constant development of epistemological thinking 
throughout this period which culminates in the publication of his Theory 
of Thought and Knowledge in 1897. In these few pages examination will 
be made of his completed doctrine only, while brief indications of any 
~. Brightman, ITP, 382. 
2. Bowne, MET, · 423. 
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marked changes in its evolution may be pointed out. Also, in order to 
indicate the type of soil from which his theory of knowledge was derived, 
some attention must be given to the great significance of rationalism and 
empiricism in Bowne's thinking. More briefly attended to will be the 
consideration of the pragmatic factor to be included in the weighing· of 
Bowne's influences. 1 
2. RATIONALISM-- The term rationalism has been used variously. Its 
different meanings will bear isolated consideration in order to relate how 
the term is applicable to Bowne. Basically rationalism may refer to 
three distinct, although neither exclusive nor completely independent 
concepts. 
· A . It may refer, in the first instance, to the strict~ priori method 
in philosophy, by which the metaphysical superstructure is deductively 
dervied from a few basic concepts, definitions, and axioms. Historical 
illustrations of the application of this principle are lucid in the methods 
of Spinoza and Leibniz. 
B. The term may also refer to the Kantian doctrine of the creative 
activity of the mind, that is, the teaching that the mind is constitutive 
in the knowing process, that knowledge is a product of minds active re-
working of the material sensuously presented to it. 
1. For much of what follows I am indebted to the exposition of Edward 
T. Ramsdell in his unpublished doctoral dissertation Pragmatic Elements 
in the Epistemology of Borden Parker Bowne, Boston University, 1932. 
c. The term ~ay simply refer to an essential faith in the trust-
worthiness of mind and in the intelligibility of the real world. 1 
One would not have to proceed far into the writings of Bowne to 
discover that he is not a rationalist according to the first meaning 
listed above. One of his frequent teachings is precisely that the real 
world cannot be deduced~ priori; it must be thought in terms of con-
crete experience. Bowne scorned every deductive sche_me of meta-
physics. One of his early criticisms of Spencer's First Principles 
was that it was "written on the ~priori plan. 112 Again, referring to 
the investigation of the laws of mental activity, Bowne states: "This 
question is not to be answered by an~ priori speculation, no matter 
how pretentious, but by an inductive consideration of the mind itself. rr3 
Bowne's statement of his own method relating to this discussion is an 
early one which weathered the vicissitudes of his philosophical evolu-
tion and remained valid to the end, it is: 
We begin with experience, external and internal. Analysis 
and reflection reveal that we cannot stop with them but must 
proceed to certain assumptions concerning their cause and 
ground. By the necessities of thought we pass from the 
facts of experience to the metaphysical notions of cause, 
l. These definitions have been formulated in light of those given in 
Baldwin 1 s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. 
2. Bowne, Art. (N. E. 1872), 86. 
3. Bowne, Art.(N.E. 1874), 463. 
absolute, etc. Hence the absolute can never be the be-
ginniy-g of knowledge, but is rather the end of inve stiga-
tion. 
75 
The second and third meanings of the term rationalism as here 
given do, however, have definite relevance as applied to Bowne's 
thought. Bowne fully accepted the essential Kantian doctrine of the 
creative activity of mind in the knowing process. In an early article 
he makes the statement, "No fact in psychology is more clearly es-
tablished than that the mind is active in all knowledge. " 2 This doctrine 
also remained an essential factor in the groundwork of his philosophy 
throughout the course of its development. 
Closely allied with this above meaning of rationalism is the third, 
namely faith in the trustworthiness of mind and the intelligibility of 
the world. Just as valid for Bowne as the previous principles these 
also are necessary conditions of knowledge and find repeated emphasis 
in his writing. "The trustworthiness of reason is the presupposition of 
all speculation. n 3 And again, "Our interpreting activity presupposes 
the intelligibility and hence the rationality ofl all existence. It pre sup-
poses that the objective reality is cast in the molds of thought, so that 
the irrational is the impossible. 114 
1. Ibid. , 626. 3. Bowne, PT, 112. 
2. Ibid., 462. 4. Bowne, Art. (Ind. 1888), 99. 
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Considerably later Bowne maintained essentially the same posi-
tion, "Hence we conclude ••• that, if there is to be any thought, the ob-
ject of thought must form a system or exist in systematic connection. •• 1 
Bowne made clear in his earlier teaching, however, that the ra-
tionality so described was an ideal 'believed in 1 more than one actually 
discerned in experience. He inveighed against post-Kantian rationalism 
as extravagant and excessive and delineated his own feelings as follows. 
We still believe in the universality of rational law, but 
we are far from being so sure that we have fully compre-
hended it. We still believe in the interpretability of fact, 
but we . are seldom able to say that we have reached a 
final interpretation. The only thing that is fixed is that 
nothing can be allowed which contradicts the laws of thought; 
But these leave a great many possibilities open, and which 
of these have been realized cannot be learned by~ priori 
reflection, but only by experience. It still remains our 
faith that the absolute reason at the center of things sees all 
things· in rational connection; but our reason is neither ab-
solute nor at the center. 2 
This should make clear in what sense rationalism is to be con-
sidered an essential element of Bowne 1s thinking. The rationality of 
the world is not a known fact or demonstrated truth but a working faith 
which leaves our best empirical deductions in the nature .of hypotheses, 
but ideally the best available hypotheses. 
1. Bowne, TTK, 34-35. 
2. Bowne, Art. (Ind. 1888), 100. 
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3. EMPIRICISM--The previous section, in treating of Bowne's ra-
tionalistic method, antiCipated in part the use of empiricism as an 
integral factor in his complete methodology. Bowne repudiates the 
traditional notion of empiricism which maintains that 11 all knowledge 
is derived from experience {and none from reason). Experience is 
d . . Ill usually treate as sense -exper1ence. 
For Bowne experience is more than sensory in that it includes 
reason, emotive factors and all that impresses itself upon the indi-
vidual either from within or without. He entitles his enlarged concept 
''Transcendental Empiricism 11 and claims, 
Instead of testing our fundamental experience by the cat-
egories, we must rather find the meaning of the eate-
gories in experience. This experience, however, is not 
the passive experience of sense, but the active self-
. f . 11' 2 exper1ence o 1nte 1gence. 
Bowne's transcendental empiricism appears ultimately at the place 
of intelligence, which cannot understand itself as a product, but must, 
as the source of all products, fall back upon experience for a knowledge 
of itself. 3 
We only know reality, Bowne would insist, by opening our eyes 
and telling what we see, or by examining experience. 4 This must be 
1. Brightman, IP, 384. 3. Ibid, 428. 
2. Bowne, MET, 424. 4. Bowne, MET, 4. 
1 
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an experience which includes reflection, however, for uncritical sen-
sory observations will profit us very little knowledge by themselves. 
The facts of experience provide the data for all problems. Experience 
as a whole is the datum for questioning the nature of reality, and this 
involves interpretation by thought. 1 Bowne is insisting that while we 
begin with the data of sense experience we do not finish there but tran-
scend them with rational thought. 2 
As thought becomes reflective and self-conscious, we 
discover that some elements of experience are given in 
sense -intuition, and that others are given only in thought. 
We begin with the data of sense experience and the 
constructions of spontaneous thought and ask what changes 
the reflective and critical reason calls for in order to 
reach an adequate interpretation. 3 
4. PRAGMATISM- -Attention will now be turned briefly to a considera-
tion of the pragmatic influences upon Bowne, and their resultant emer-
gence in his teaching. 
Kant, as has been noted, was one of Bowne•s philosophical fathers 
from the rationalistic tradition, but Kant also had a doctrine of practical 
reason which was primary in many respects. At least these following 
pragmati<r elements in Kant may have left their mark upon Bowne: (1) 
the primacy of the practical reason; (2) emphasis upon interests in the 
life of the mind; (3) the regulative function of the speculative reason; 
1. Ibid., 5. 
2. Ibid. , 6. 
3. Ibid., 7, 9. 
1 7 
(4) utility and rational possibility as criteria of belief; and (5) the 
'will to believe ' . 1 
2 Even though Charles Peirce acknowledged a debt to Kant for 
the formation of pragmatism, he is usually credited with being re-
sponsible for its pure formulation. The pragmatism of Peirce, so 
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far as it is pragmatism is largely that of his doctrine of meaning. If 
ideas have no practical effects, they hav·e no real meaning; and if two 
ideas have the same effect , then their meaning is identical. It was 
William James however who extended the concept to an identification 
3 
of truth and meaning. For Peirce effects might well give us the 
meaning of an idea but not necessarily constitute its truth. James is 
often inconsistent on this point but usually fails to interpret the spirit 
of Peirce adequately, so that ultimately the latter rechristened his 
doctrine 'pragmaticism' . 4 There were other and vitally eminent con-
tributors to the formulation of pragmatism of course. This thesis is 
not primarily concerned with pragmatism · per ~but only to the extent 
that it may have influenced Bowne. At least it appears necessary to 
admit that it was a constituent eleme.nt in the philosophical atmosphere 
in which Bowne breathed; that. some of it pervaded his thinking is obvious 
l. For further treatment of these elements see Ramsdell, doctoral dis-
sertation, B. U. 1932. 
2 . In his collected papers edited by Hartshorne a nd Weiss V, 274. 
3. Cf. Ramsdell, PhD., B . U., 1932. 
4. The name being cumbersome a nd suggested after the other had 
'arrived', did not stick however and Peirce was no hand to argue the 
distinction . 
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from his writings. Both rationalism and pragmatism carved channels 
in Bowne's thought of varying depth. In his acceptance of the trust-
worthiness of reason and of the rationality of the real, in his concep-
tion of the mind as creative in its cognitive activity, in his definition 
of logic and mathematics as strictly rational truths which are valid 
~priori, in his employment of deduction in systematic metaphysics, 
in his critical examination of basiC concepts; and in his acceptance of 
the criteria of consistency, harmony with the rest of knowledge, and 
adequacy to explain facts, Bowne was a thoroughgoing rationalist. 1 
It may even be suggested that his early developed and persisting em-
pirical tendencies are interpreted rationally rather than empirically. 
There are however, pragmatic assertions whether overt or 
otherwise detectable in his description of mind as an organic unity 
of vital interests which control basic beliefs. The pragmatic leaning 
is also noticed in his support of Kant's emphasis upon the instrumen-
tality of theoretical reason relative to man's vital in~erests, and in his 
validation of cognitive postulates in terms of interest satisfaction, and, 
in the field of moral and religious concern, his at least partial acceptance 
of the 'will to believe'. Leaving this admittedly sketchy treatment of 
the background of Bowne's thought, the next problem which must be en-
countered is an exposition of the terms of the knowledge process. 
1. Cf. Ramsdell, PhD., B. U., 1932. 
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5. NATURE OF MIND--When Bowne affirms the existence of a self 
he does not intend to denote anything picturable br sensationally 
available, but "only what we mean and experience when we say 1I 1 • 
And this self, so far from being a questionable fact, is one of the surest 
items of experience. "l In his later writing Bowne became even more 
confirmed in this conviction and made bold to say; "The self itself as 
the subject of the mental life and knowing and experiencing itself as 
living, and as one and the same throughout its changing experiences, is 
the surest item of knowledge we possess. 112 
In his view of the nature of mind Bowne followed in the activistic tra-
dition of Leibniz, Berkeley and Kant. Being under the direct influence 
of Lotze and Ulrici while in Germany, his conception became empirical 
as well as logical. "In consciousness••, he states, ••we know ourselves 
as self-determining activities. •• 3 And in another place, "Self as per-
ceiving, is the most fundamental datum of consciousness. ••4 Bowne re-
belled vehemently against the Spencerian sensationalistic view of mind 
held by many of his contemporaries. ••Mind is neither a state nor a series 
of states, but a being which experiences these states. •• 5 Empiricism and 
logic go hand in hand for Bowne as he recognizes that for a comprehension 
of even the pas sibility of experience we must logically pre suppose a unified 
1. Bowne, TTK, 27. 4. Bowne, PHS, 159. 
2. Bowne, PER, 88. 5. Ibid. , 119. 
3. Bowne, Art. (MQR 1874), 274. 
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self. "Knowledge is not knowledge until it is related to self. It is 
only the enduring and identical ego which gives unity to experience 
and makes memory possible." 1 Further, he insists that "the subjec-
tive unity of self must be given before knowledge of any kind is pos-
sible. ,,Z 
The mind continues its active function throughout all experience 
even the receiving of impressions from outside. Bowne would in fact 
urge that "sensation is impossible without an inner activity of the 
3 
soul." Without attention from within sensations would knock in vain 
upon the door of our minds. lnterpretation, attention, comparison, 
judgment, imagination, etc. are functions of the unified self in its 
constant activity. 
6. CATEGORIES--Stressed throughout Bowne•s work is the concept 
of mind •s cognitive activity according to forms or norms implicit in 
it. "The categories inherent in our mental constitution give form to 
experience and produce original syntheses, before the mind iTself be-
comes conscious of its own aims and the principles which govern it. 114 
Further he states, "we do not regard them as existing primarily as 
ideas, but as being determinative principles of mental procedure, or 
as constitutive principles of intelligence. 115 
1. Ibid. , 180 
2. Ibid., 185. 
3 • Ibid. , 15 3. 
4. Bowne, IPT, 286. 
5. Ibid., 174. 
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Though mind operates according to the categories for Bowne, 
he does not believe they are logically deducible as Kant attempted to 
demonstrate. He says: 
We may say that the categories are the condition of all 
knowledge and of all objects, but this is by no means to 
deduce them, it is rather to discover them as the actual 
conditions of the consciousness we actually possess. 1 
The activities of mind "fall into certain classes, and these classes 
may only be looked upon as expressing general forms of mental action 
and as founded in the nature of the mind itself. " 2 Thus the categories 
are 'modes of mental operation. They are the forms which the mind 
gives to its experience. " 3 Again, "They are the norms by which the 
mind proceeds, implicitly or explicitly, in fixing, defining, and re-
lating its objects. They constitute the framework of thought, and form 
the contents of the pure reason. 114 And, as such, they are "immanent 
in the activity itself. 115 
Concerningthe number of categories, Bowne makes it clear that 
that is a matter of little consequence. It is important however that 
whatever is designated as a category of mind really be one. He writes: 
There is .•• no objection to one's making as many cate-
gories as he pleases, provided always they represent 
real forms of mental activity; and there is also no ob-
jection to making as few as one pleases, provided, again 
1. Bowne, KS, 77. 4. Bowne, TTK, 59. 
2. Bowne, TTK, 115. 5. Ibid. , 61. 
3. Bowne, PER, 105. 
the categories do not put incommensurable things 
together, and do not overlook real forms of mental 
activity. 1 
8L~ 
In so far as he is concerned with specific listings of categories 
Bowne classifies them accordingly a .s metaphysical or phenomenal. 
Under the former he lists being, quality, identity, causality and pur-
pose with necessity and possibility considered as doubtful. Under the 
latter phenomenal categories he lists space, time, motion, number 
and quantity. The inclusion of purpose as a category and as one which 
increases in importance throughout the development of Bowne's thought, 
denotes his contention that mind not only acts in reference to ends, but 
it can know and understand its experience in any ultimate sense only 
within a teleological framework. "Thought must become teleological 
before it can complete itself. " 2 
7. SUMMARY- -In summarizing Bowne 1 s teaching of the nature of the 
rational principle in man reference will be made to a series ofques-
tions which he asks and answers, from his own perspective, in his 
Metaphysics. 3 
A. Can the mental life be deduced from physical organization? 
Bowne answers: No, because of the fact that thought clearly lies out-
u 
side of physical causation not being a physical movement or grouping. 
This is not a denial that thought may be accompanied by physical 
1. Ibid. , 115- 16 . 
2. Bowne, TTK, 107. 
3 . Bowne, MET, 344,.48 . 
or neural movements however. 
B. Cannot mental activity be understood apart from postulating 
a real abiding subject of thought and feeling distinct from the physical 
elements? It cannot, answers Bowne. No possible mysterious inter-
action of physical elements could result in the mental life which we 
experience. In fact, to the contrary, we should not perceive the inter-
action of these physical elements without the one and abiding self. 
C. In what sense is the mental life dependent upon the organism? 
Dependence must be properly conceived. It may mean either causal 
' production of, or it may mean an order of concomitant variation in. 
In the first sense mental life is not dependent upon the organis.m. In 
the second sense there is a mutual dependence of each on the other. 
For Bowne, mental life could exist apart from any physical organism. 
This would be in a different realm of discourse than our present one 
however. In our cosmic system there must be a fixed element for giv-
ing and receiving impulses. This fixed element is organism as we know 
it and for present purposes is necessary. 
D. Is this concept of a non-material soul or mind essential for 
psychology? Many problems of descriptive psychology could be handled 
without reference to metaphysical principles, but these are superficial 
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problems which, if allowed to lead our thinking will soon confront us 
with the important questions. Analyses on the basis of experience 
become metaphysical as soon as they ask how experience is possible, 
and here they are confronted with the rational non-physical, unified 
self or mind. 
8. THE KNOWING PROCESS--With the exposition of the nature of 
mind as a basis, the present task of this study is to examine the scope 
of its activities in knowing. Here again, it is not the intent of the 
present writer to perform a metaphysical investigation, but if the cog-
nitive relation is to be comprehended meaningfully one must ask some 
explanation of the nature of the object. If the idea and object were 
identified in the cognitive relation, it would not be necessary to labor 
this point, but there is no opportunity of mistaking Bowne 1 s dualism. 
''However necessary our thoughts as mental events may be for the 
grasping of the fact, they can never be identified with the fact." 1 And 
again, "From the human standpo~nt •.• there is an ineradicable dualism 
of thought and thing. rr 2 Perhaps there is a clue in Bowne 1s phrase "From 
the human standpoint", nontheless we only operate from the human 
standpoint so must face and explain the dualism which is .engaged. For 
1. Bowne, TTK, 15-16. 
2. Ibid., 296. 
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Bowne, and perhaps anyone else, everything is what it is because 
of its nature, and things differ because they have differing natures. 
To ask what is the thing, and to ask what is its nature is to ask the 
same question. The fundamental mark of all being is activity for 
Bowne. "Whatever truly exists, whether matter of spirit, must be 
viewed as essentially active, and as diffe.:mii:ng, therefore, only in 
the form or kind of activity. "l Activity or being in general apart 
from any law or form would be impossible or at least unrecognizable, 
so definiteness must be lent to being. It is this rule or law which 
determines the sequence and form of what would otherwise be unin-
telligible {activity or being), which represents the essential nature of 
objects to thought. "It is under this general form of a law determining 
the form and sequence of activity that we •.• think of the nature of the 
thing. 112 Things differ, as has been seen, only in their kind of activity, 
but this does not imply that they have a common being which would lead 
us back to a notion -of pure being. "Things exist only in their activi-
ties, and have no being apart from them. They are ••• concreted formu-
las of action. ,.3 
A question may be raised at what seems to be a claim that laws 
are natures of things. We might complain that a law is only a formula 
1. B'owne, MET, 30. 
2. Bowne, MET, 30. 
3. Ibid. , 31. 
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of thought while things are real. A law, we could urge, is not and 
never could be a thing. Bowne would admit this objection has des-
tructive properties when applied to absolute idealism which identifies 
thought and object. Were we able to have a perfect formula for the 
nature of any object the formula would not be the real nature but the 
conceived nature. There would still be an impassable gulf between 
a thought and a thing because of their ineffable difference. The above 
f. t accusation Bowne would admit, but what are we actually admitting in 
this confession. Only that we cannot make reality nor tell how it is 
made. "The ••• question, how a law can be set in reality so that, from 
being a thought, it becomes a thing, involves the myste:ryof creation, 
or of absolute being. "l Being is not produced by taking an idea and 
stuffing it with a formless reality, for Bowne. "But when being is 
made, it is simply a concrete formula of action. 112 Naive thought still 
protests that there must be a prior being which receives the law or 
follows the law, but is certainly deeper than or more real fhan any law 
of its action. Bowne would grant that this notion has a certain validity 
for our own experience with the outer world, where we are not creators 
but only users of given material. To apply the argument to a proper 
reality or agent would however reduce us once more to the nothingness 
1. Bowne, MET, 40. 
2. Ibid. , 41. 
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of pure being, which could not follow or realize a law if the law were 
not essential to its being. "Being without law is nothing; and law 
without being is also nothing." 1 The nature of the law to which we re-
fer is causality. "Being in distinction from non-being finds its mark 
in causality. Things find defin itene ss to exist ••• in the law of this 
causality. Different things find the ground of their differences in the 
different laws of the respective causalities. ••2 
It might now be profitable to venture deep into the field of meta-
physics, and would in fact be necessary for a vindication of Bowne's 
essential theory, but this study will be satisfied merely to list his 
presuppositions, and examine the deduction of the knowing relation 
from them. 
1. To escape solipsistic absurdity I must admit there are 
other existences beside my own, at least other persons, in the world. 
2. This world of apparent objects exists not only for me alone 
but for others, so that we share existence in a common world. 
3. This common world is not merely a similarity of impressions 
in finite minds so that the world is nothing apart from these impressions. 
4. The only view which does not involve us in insuperable dif-
ficulties sees the world of things as a continuous existence of some 
kind, independent of finite thought and consciousness. 
5. This world of continuous existence is only to be conceived 
1. Ibid. , 42. 
2. Ibid., 43. 
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as in and for a cosmic intelligence apart from which it would be absurd 
and e<:mtradictory. 1 
From these propositions, at least from the first four, one might 
very well deduce a realistic conclusion of the matter. A world which 
we did not make, and which is independent of all finite thought and con-
sciousness, might be identical with that of several realistic metaphysical 
theories. But we must distinguish that being independent of~ thought 
is not to be independent of all thought. The fifth foundation block is 
the one which realistic builders disavow. The world of things as we ex-
perience it has for its cause and ultimate metaphysical ground, the cos-
rnic intelligence which Bowne posits as necessary for his transcenden-
tal realism in epistemology. 
For just as surely as the world of things in space is 
phenomenal, just so surely can it have its existence 
only in intelligence: and just so surely as it does not 
depend upon our intelligence, just so surely must we 
affirm a cosmic intelligence as its abiding seat and 
condition. 2 
Hence it is clear that on Bowne •s view the world exists only in and for 
a supreme mind: but in what manner? Were it analogous to the finite 
situation we should have only a mind of passive conceptions with no real 
world of existent:a: for finite experience. This has in fact been the col-
lapse of some idealistic systems, and a danger which even Bishop 
l. This material is found expressed at greater length in Bowne, TTK, 
328-29. 
2. Bowne, TTK, 342. 
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Berkeley seems not to have completely avoided. It is avoidable how-
ever when we realize that the fundamental reality is not merely mind 
or understanding, but also agent or will. This makes the world not 
merely idea but will and idea, or act with a conceptual form in the 
divine mind and an active counterpart in the divine will. This is the 
fact which secures for the world a real existence instead of only a 
conceptual one. Bowne expresses it succinctly as follows: 
Let us say, then, that the world is essentially a going 
forth of divine eausality under the forms of space and 
time, and in accordance with a rational plan. The out-
come of this activity is the phenomenal world, which is 
neither outside nor inside of God in a spatial sense, but 
which exists in unpicturable dependence upon the divine 
will; as our thoughts are neither outside nor inside of 
the mind in a spatial sense, but depend upon the mind as 
their cause and subject. 1 
It will be plain to the reader that this is both realism and idealism. 
It is· realism as opposed to the idealism of sensationalism or presenta-
tionalism, and also in its insistence upon an objective cosmic system 
independent of finite minds. It is idealism in its contention for the 
phenomenality of the cosmic system existing only in, for and through 
intelligence. Allowing this to serve as a metaphysical background, at-
tention will now be focused upon the manner in which this world becomes 
an object for finite m i nds. 
1. Bowne, TTK, 342-43. 
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9. THE COGNITIVE RELATION--The essential question in episte-
mology is: "Is the mind active or passive in knowledge? "l It was 
pointed out briefly in dealing with the nature of mind that Bowne con-
tends repeatedly for · the activity of thought process, . but how is that 
activity to be conceived? "Thought first goes straight to things, and 
if it stumbled on no contradictions among its conceptions it would prob-
ably never suspect the existence and complexity of its own processes. •• 2 
Here Bowne is citing an empirical fact to which most would agree. 
For example Blanshard says, "Thought is that activity of mind which 
aims directly at truth. ••3 
It has been indicated that a conception of mind is possible which 
holds objects to be created by the mind in its pure self activity, and 
with dependence upon nothing beyond itself. This is Bowne 1 s concep-
tion of the cosmic intelligence, but it does not follow for finite minds 
except to a slight degree. There is a sense in which our thought objects 
are given to experience. This allows an amount of passivity in knowl-
edge, but does not deny the fact of mental activity which would make ob-
jects to some degree our own products. For even though the object 
exist, and, in some sense be given to us, it is nothing for intelligence 
1. Ibid., 4. 
2. Ibid., 5. 
3. Blanshard, NOT, 51. 
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until we think it and make it ~object. So our concern is with active 
thought where by rational consciousness and articulate experience be-
come possible. 
"At the base of our thought life is the life of sense. This is some-
thing given. 111 Although no effort of ours can produce or modify the 
laws of sense we are not to think of them as something thrown off from 
objects or produced by nerves and served ready-made to consciousness. 
The elementary reaction of . our sensibility to external action is not a 
product of thought but a datum for thought. Before any judgment can 
be formed however we have acted upon the datum. "Even in the simplest 
judgment of sense we have found not an interaction of sensations, but 
an action upon sensations, a unique synthesis by thought. 11 2 The impres-
sion of a sensation is as good as nothing for us until the mind constitutes 
it one and identical. Pas sing sensations would be passing in oblivion 
unless mind lent meaning to them. A color sensation becomes a sensa-
tion of color by mental activity or i s nothing for intelligence. Bowne 
goes directly back to the earliest stage of experience for the introduction 
of mental activity. "There is ••• an implicit logical activity in the simplest 
sensation by the time it is anything for intelligence. 113 
1. Bowne, TTK, 37. 
2. Ibid. , 3 7. 
3. Ibid., 41. 
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The empirical fact of recurrence demands a universalizing 
intelligence for Bowne. Literal recurrence of identical experiences, 
sensations, or ideas is impossible as psychological fact. What we 
mean by recurrence is the occurrence of similar experiences, sensa-
tions, or ideas. But we should never know this apart from the ability 
of mind to universalize and recognize similarity. Bowne states the 
necessary activity of mind in so elementary a process as recurrence 
as follows. 
It appears that for an experience of recurrence, even 
of sensation, we need (l}to relate our sensations under 
the form of time, (2}to raise the sensation from a par-
ticular event into an abiding logical meaning, and (3} 
to assimilate the later experience to the earlier by 
identifying the contents common to both. 1 · 
Of course mind performs its intricate activities without concen-
tration upon its own processes. The digestive system works without 
understanding its functions. If we had been compelled to argue our way 
from the self to the not-self it might have been disastrous for mental 
health. As it is we have difficulty speculatively construing the pas sage 
of thought once it is eompleted. 
The work of mind is to know and this it proceeds to do, but this 
has been admitted on all sides with greatly varying conclusions. Two 
impossibilities are considered by Bowne at the outset, and while he urges 
1. Bowne, TTK, 44. 
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that they are impossibilities he must also acknowledge that they have 
been offered constantly as very truth, although neatly draped in subtle 
guises of-vague terminology. These facts are that "The object itself 
cannot pass bodily into consciousness, and consciousness c·annot expand 
itself and embrace the existing object. 111 That is to say, "The mind can 
do nothing but think, and the object can do nothing but be. 112 This is not 
a conception of knowledge as magic; we still must allow for bringing 
the two terms together. While the idealist has disposed of the lumpish-
ness of realism he has replaced it with an order of existence in and for 
a supreme mind, which nontheless must be known. The enigma of realism 
is still problematic for Bowne who admits, "The question -remains, How 
. the cosmic order can become an object for us; and the answer is, Only 
by thinking it, or constructing it in thought, and thus making it our ob-
ject. 113 Bowne rejects the proposals of naive realism as taking for granted 
more than has to be. Among views he rejects are the .teachings that 
images are thrown off the object and pass into mind mediating knowledge 
of the object, or that the object impresses, stamps, or photographs itself 
upon the mind, or that there is a caase and effect interaction. of any kind 
allowing a reciprocal passing between the faculty which knows and that 
which it knows. More acceptable to his view is the teaching that in 
1. Ibid., 49, my italics. 
2. Bowne, TTK, 49. 
3. Ibid., 50. 
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interaction nothing really passes between the terms of the relation; 
"but each reacts according to its own nature •• .under the circum stances. 111 
Thus, "If ••• a mind react against external action by generating feeling, 
thoughts, and knowledge within itself, these are not to be viewed as 
carried into the mind, but as generated by the mind. 112 
As has been seen, in the idealistic view, on which the object is 
conceived as thought as well as mind (although of a cosmic intelligence) 
we have no easy deliverance of the problem of perception. For we have 
only moved from the quandry of how to make lumpish matter our thought 
to the equally frustrating one of how to make the cosmic thought our own. 
"On both views we have the problem of reproducing in human thought 
the objective fact, be it reai or ideal. ''3 Again, "That the world should 
exist as a divine thought does not imply its existence for my thought any 
more than the possession of knowledge by the teacher implies its posses-
sion by the pupil. " 4 Bowne recognizes this as a real problem which 
will never be settled by appeals to figures of speech. To say that we 
participate in the divine thought is merely a redundancy. To claim we 
are a phase of the divine thought contradicts diversity of opinion and idea 
and makes the source of all error and confusion the cosmic intelligence. 
1. Ibid., 52. 3. Loc. cit. 
2. Loc. cit. 4. Loc. cit. 
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Here great stress must be laid upon the activity of mind. Activity that 
is, not to pass thought along bodily, apart from thinking, but rather to 
create knowledge by acting upon the objective divine thought. 
The conclusion is that a world of things can exist for 
us only as the mind reconstructs it as a world of 
thought •••• However real or ideal the world may be, it 
becomes an object for us only as the mind builds up in 
consciousness a system of conceptions. and relates 
their contents under the various forms of intelligence. 1 
So it appears fundamental that Bowne's theory of knowledge de-
mands an abiding order, independent of our finite thinking, which 
becomes our mental possession only by the reconstitutive or recon-
structive activity of our minds. "In this way existence slowly passes 
into knowledge. 112 
1. Bowne, TTK, 56, my italics. 
2. Ibid., 57. 
CHAPTER V 
CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE SUMMARY 
l. CRITICAL--The purpose of this final chapter is twofold. First 
the views which were presented as the essence of three theories of 
knowledge will be evaluated relative to internal consistency and em-
pirical coherence. Criticism throughout the thesis up to this point has 
intentionally been kept at a minimum to insure, as far as possible, 
lucid and unbiased presentation of the particular view for itself. Lack 
of criticism at certain crucial points did not, of course, reflect agree-
ment or dis interest with any erroneous or questionable aspects of 
theory. 
The second question to be asked, and one for which an answer 
will be attempted concerns the possibility of any reconciliation among 
the three thinkers under scrutiny. In the beginning this study declared 
itself to be intent upon an inquiry into the relative functions of reasoning, 
intuition, and sense experience. The pursuit has often led into dark and 
mysterious realms which appeared to serve only to enlarge the gulf 
which separates the three subjects. 
The theory of knowledge as conceived by any theorist is one thing, 
and the fact of knowing is quite another. The fact t h at we are able to 
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think and grasp, in some manner, the reality of external objects does 
not depend for its certainty upon any clearly defined explanation of how 
or why this indeed can be . Ultimately epistemology, like all discourse, 
is descriptive. No philosopher asks why we have thought rather than no 
thought, but only how do we in fact reason, judge, apprehend or know the 
object of our conscious experience .. 
In treating these three recent philosophers the subject was ap-
proached in a reverse chronological order. John Wild is at the time of 
this writing still actively instructing in philosophy at Harvard University. 
His position is being constantly refined in light of all available evidence, 
and noticeable in his published works is a progression of thought indica-
tive of an open and seeking intellect . Wild has been classified generally 
as a Thomistic Realist, but has functio ned more as a critic of the scho-
lastic approach to thinking while alignin g him self more directly with 
Aristotelian realism . 
W hen citing what he saw to be the distinction between realistic and 
idealistic approaches to the knowledge problem Wild made the following 
statement which bears examination. 
Realism i s the philosophy of reality, based necessarily on 
the all-embracing concept of being ... in spite of idealism 
being (ens) is distinct from being- before -the -mind (ens 
rationis) . 1 
l. Wild , A rt. (1947), 152. 
&I) f;u 
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This assertion might well be in spite of ~ variations of idealism, 
but it might also accord agreeably with others. Wild, for example, is 
unquestionably indicting the Berkeleyan view of objective reality. In 
speaking of non-thinking things Berkely said: "Their ~is percipi; 
nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or 
t h inking things which perceive them." 1 And Berkeley might not encoun-
ter any great difficulty in recruiting adherents to this interpretation, 
but he would encounter much opposition from the host of contemporary 
idealists who have modified his position. A clear example may be seen 
in B. P. Bowne whose thought has been treated above, and who claims 
of the distinguishing mark of being that: 
We cannot place it in the presentation for then. we become 
Berkeleians ••. things when not perceived are still said to 
exist •••• This is what is .salled my ••• objective idealism ••. 
emphasizing the independence of the object of individual 
subjectivity. 2 
Bowne would insist that being {ens} as well as being-before-the-
mind (ens rationis} is of the nature of mind, but as far as distinction be-
tween them is concerned he would agree essentially with Wild. 
Wild 1s view of the psyche has been called into question on the basis 
of his claim that it is distinguishable from the human faculties. He defines 
the psyche as "that which makes any animal body live while the animal 
1. Berkeley•s Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I, Sec. 3. 
2. Bowne, MET, 16 , 423. 
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is alive. The human psyche means that which makes the human bod y 
live and act like a man.'' 1 Wild holds to this distinction of faculties 
and psyche on the basis of his Aristotelian conception of life as first 
cause and form of the body which is matter. The faculties are necessary 
accidents of the psyche, in fact are formally caused by it as soon as it 
is brought into existence. Still they are distinct in the same manner in 
which the number three, which is necessarily odd, is formally distinct 
from odd (one odd number is three while many numbers are odd). 2 Of 
course the question is still valid as to just what would be the nature of 
this psyche once all its faculties were removed. And the a n swer, whether 
it proved satisfactory or not would be put by Wild- - "The psyche is ••• the 
formal structure, the most important part of certain natural substances 
which exist in themselves. " 3 
The most obstreperously ~.bstinate opposition to Wild 1s epistemology 
comes from those who call into surveilance his notion of noetic identi~y 
or assimilation. His opposers want to know how such an interpretat ion 
can be supported either empirically or rationally. Wild 1 s claim has 
been that we must assimilate something from the object which is structu-
rally or formally distinct from the material of the object, if knowing is 
to be taken in any true, literal sense of the word. 4 Yet he does not claim 
1. Wild, IRP, 396. 
2. Ibid., 402-405. 
~ . Ibid. , 397. 
4. Ibid., 410 
()~ 
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infallibility, and allows for the occasioning of error on the part of 
sensory impression and even affecting the highly complex level of 
conceptual amalgamation of the deliverances of sense. One might, with 
good reason, ask what is profited by a direct identification which al-
lows error at almost every level. If, as Wild claims, knowledge is 
I 
of something precisely as it is formally, how do we know when we 
have obtained it and why do we not always identify with the forms of 
objects veridically? 
Samuel Alexander is hailed as the greatest systematizer of 
philosophical speculation in British thought since Hobbes. He was a Jew 
who would have considered it eternal bliss to have been pronounced · 
11wrong with Spinoza'' in some of his deductions. Whether with or with-
out Spinoza he has been frequently pronounced wrong by his reviewers, 
and some of those aspects of his system which are particularly vul-
nerable to this pronunciation must be considered briefly. 
Alexander's cognitive relation of compresence, a relation which 
holds for all finite existents, has caused some concern in philosophical 
circles. His argument, which holds contemplation to be the mind's ap-
prehension of an object other than itself, involves an inner duality of sub-
ject and object. 2 The mind enjoys itself in the process of contemplating 
1. Wild, PTM. 270. 
2. Alexander, STD, I, 12. 
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a foreign object. Contemplation involves the compresence of the two 
constituents of knowledge, namely consciousness and its object. The 
object of contemplative knowledge is an independent existent which has 
entered into a cognitive relation with a mind. There is a sense certainly 
in which his realism is metaphysically monistic, but his continued admis-
sion of the inner duality of consciousness and its object marks his episte-
mology as dualistic. He considers all sense qualities as inherent in the 
object contemplated by mind; the content and the object of knowledge are 
completely identified. Those who call him an epistemological monist inter-
pret this incorrectly to involve such a monism. 
Alexander 1 s extension of the term •know 1 to de scribe a relation 
which obtains among all levels of finite existents causes one to suspect 
he has little regard for the unique character of the knowledge relation. 
And it becomes evident that, as a relation, he attributes it no uniqueness, 
but only because one of the terms is unique. Orewonders further what is 
unique about the term mind or mental process, which has evolved from a 
matrix common to all finite empirical existents. 
Alexander allows no parallelism of neural and mental processes 
but insists upon an identity between them. 
The mental process and its neural process are one and 
the same existence, not two existences . As mental it 
is .. . enjoyed by the experient; as neural it is contemplated 
by an outsider or may be contemplated in thought by the 
experient himself. 1 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 9. 
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The insistence which Alexander would refute finds expression 
in the claim of many idealists that mind has certain specific charac-
ters to which there is, or even can be, no neural counterpart which 
completely accounts for their operation. Alexander considers at some 
length several of the instances which would be cited as mental formu-
lations not explicable on a merely psysico-chemical basis. The first 
of these, and the only one of which will be treated here, is meaning. 
His claim to meaning as a neural process with the peculiar quality of 
consciousness may be open to question. He perhaps rightly divides 
meaning into two sens.es; {1) to indicate an object--!~ you, and (2) 
for intension in which a word is used with a meaning- -a flower may 
f h "t 1 mean or you a person w o gave 1 • 
Treating each of the two cases in turn Alexander explains mean-
ing as objective indication, or what he calls meaning as extension, as 
contrasted to the second use of meaning as intension. On his view the 
problem of extension takes the form of whether the relation of the conscious 
subject to its object is unique or merely an instance of the relationship 
obtaining, wherever two finite exis t ences are found together. To be 
conscious of an object, on his view, does turn out to mean nothing more 
than this. To take a particular instance, a chair excites in my mind a 
1. Ibid., 15. 
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conscious process of perceiving it. One may challenge Alexander's 
authority to present this definition of meaning, as analogous to the 
relationship between the stomata of leaves and air in which analogy he 
1 
avers that the leaves 'mean' the air to which they are adapted. 
The other sense of meaning is, however, more unavoidably rele-
vant, and Alexander admits, offers real difficulty. Meaning in this 
case is a conscious condition of mind as when, for instance, the symbol 
-\f-"1 means its mathematical interpretation. Now Alexander asks where 
is the difficulty in accepting his notion that the conseious meaning is 
identical with a certain neural process? 
If mental life is mental processes arranged in various 
complicated patterns, why should not a word set going 
in my brain, and also in my mind, that pattern of pro-
cess which we call the meaning? 2 
Alexander continues in this line of reasoning to make neural pro-
cesses responsible for and identical with mental processes, and can 
claim that mental connections which have corresponding neural connec-
tions are as much conscious as what they connect. Thus for Alexander, 
meaning remains a unitary whole while still possessing its neural counter-
3 part. On this basis he is able to conclude: 
If meaning is thus neural as well as mental, it follows 
that a very slight change i n an object, or stimulus, may 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 16. 
2. Ibid. , 1 7. 
3. Loc. cit. 
1), 
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produce an overwhelming difference in the mental res-
ponse if that change is charged with meaning. 1 
Of course 'if' is the question which Alexander still leaves open. 
He cannot demonstrate empirically that neural and mental activities 
are identical. It would seem in fact that the most empirically verifia-
ble position would be to say that neural process is certainly a necessary 
condition of consciousness or thinking but not to assert, as Alexander 
does, that neural process is thinking. 
In dealing with doctrine of assurance, Alexander speaks of our 
direct experience of other minds. 2 Others speak of direct experience 
in an epistemological context with quite different intention than does 
Alexander, (notably for this discussion , Wild) and this varied use of 
the term demands inquiry in Alexander's own use of what might other-
wise be a confusing expression. 
Alexander insists that while we have this direct experience of 
minds in others, such experience is not knowledge by the mode either of 
contemplating of the external or enjoyment of ourselves. 3 Thus we are 
assured of other minds only on the ground of specific experience in the 
social emotion which finds satisfaction only by reciprocal action on the 
part of others. 4 Were it not for this social response emotion we should 
1. Loc. cit. 3. Loc. cit. 
2. Alexander, STD, II, 37. 4. Alexander, STD, II, 380-81. 
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not be able to arrive speculatively at the notion of minds other than 
our own. Therefore it should be clear that on Alexander's view direct 
experience in assurance involves no actual entering into' or identity of 
subject and object of knowledge. 
Perhaps the most crucial point of criticism involving Alexander's 
entire philosophy is also valid for his epistemology. The criticism 
arises from his repeated claim that from a mind which is lacking con-
tent he derives a mental process with content as well as active al).d 
passive functions. 
Sinee the object is, in the cognitive situation, an existence dis-
tinct from the mind and only selected by it Alexander insists there is 
nothing in the mind but acts. 1 "Act in this usage is equivalent to pro-
cess and does not imply the special activity which is felt in certain men-
tal processes or acts like desire or endeavor or willing. 112 It includes 
not only the activities of volition but pass·ive acts of sense as well, all 
of which Alexander groups together under the one term conation. 3 Cog-
nition is conation: mental process or consciousness is attention which 
includes both passive and active aspects. 
Conations are of tWo kinds, practical and theoretical for Alexan-
der, and this distinction explains why we think of t h e cognitive aspect 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 118. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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of conation as something distinct from it which it in reality is not. Prac-
tical or primary conation issues in movements which tend to alter the 
object or at least affect our relation to it. Theoretical conations are 
those which do not affect our relation to the object in terms of altering 
or destroying it, but rather act to sustain our attention to it. 1 
"Now the contents of the mental acct or process are those which it 
possesses as a process, simple or complicated. " 2 Alexander is here 
claiming that the contents of the conational activity, which is mental pro-
cess, are empirical determinations of categorial characters or certai n 
empir.ical determinations of Space- Time. 3 · These inherent spatia-
temporal features differentiate between one mental act and another ac-
cording to the apprehended object. In another place Alexander couples 
both notions, which appears to lead him ultimately into difficulty. 
First, with me mental happenings are dynamic from the 
outset, being identical with certain physiological processes. 
Second, no mental event is a '"content"; the characters of 
green or sweet ••• do not belong to the mental process ••• but 
to the physical object. 4 
Mental acts vary according to the object experienced. As the 
object varies, however slightly, so does the corresponding enjoyment 
vary however slightlr. 5 This variation in the mind is not however a 
variation of quality since mind has only the quality of being conscious. 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 120. 4. Alexander, STD, I, xx. 
2. Ibid., 127. 5. Ibid., 26. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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As has been previously stressed, the cognitive relation is in no sense 
unique except as this characteristic of uniqueness is lent to it by one 
of the terms- - mental process, consciousness or mind . But mind is 
identified with a neural physiological proce·ss and is made up of content-
less acts. Compresence is the relation of these acts (mind) to their 
referent. 
Because of the distinction between content and knowing Alexander 
has to say that the contemplated always refers to the same object of 
which class mind is not a member. It would appear that in the name 
of empiricism he has abstracted activity from acting content, and claims 
that perceiving is an act with no content. 
Another underlying assumption of Alexander's system, which he 
neglects to defend, is contained in his rejection of behaviorism, which he 
spurns on the ground that mind is a quality. 1 Quality must be a character 
of or predicable of something and the only thing Alexander has is body so 
he is consistent in asserting this conclusion. Might it not be questioned 
however whether mind is merely a quality- -is it not rather the individual ' s 
experience? The question might be pressed even further to an enquiry 
of how a quality can be a subject; and the alternative suggested that per-
haps a more coherent view would be to posit the subject as the locus of 
qualities. 
1. Alexander, STD, I, xix-xx. 
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Alexander makes an unwarranted assumption at the outset of 
his book, and strangely enough, it is one against which he warns his 
readers. His caution is to avoid making the assumption that objects 
are mental, 1 and he in turn assumes they are not mental. 2 In order 
to be convincing as an advisor Alexander would be compelled to say 
that objects are neutral and proceed empirically from x as object. 
His inconsistency amounts to a denial of his definition of metaphysics. 3 
The point at which Bowne has been criticized most harshly, even 
by those who follow in his tradition, is in his insistence of a mind apart 
from its conscious states, which resembles to some degree a soul 
psychology. His affirmation of the existence of the self includes the 
assertion that this is the surest item of experience. 4 It is held to be 
the subject of mental life which remains the same throughout its chang-
5 ing experiences. - Some of these statements have been sources of 
difficulty to those who succeeded and have endeavored to formulate a 
personalistic psychology; particularly disturbing is his repeated insis-
tence that mind is a being which experiences its states but is distinct 
from them. 6 However, Bowne is not wholly consistent in his maintenance 
of a soul psychology. There is noticeable ambivalence which approaches 
a climax in his later Metaphysics. Here he notes that thought is impossible 
1. Ibid., . I,-6. 4 . Bowne, TTK, 27. 
2. Ibid., I, 10-11. 5. Bowne, PER, 88. 
3. Ibid., I, 2. 6. Bowne, PHS t 159. 
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except through a unitary, abiding and active self, but equates any view 
which does not see the soul to be a proper agent acting out of itself 
with materialism, and proceeds to refute this position as untenable. 
Bowne does away with the notion of soul as a lump of inert sub-
stance, but when questioned as to what remains besides a stream of 
thought which is all, he hesitates admitting there is some merit to the 
question, but refusing to be carried along. 2 For identity to be meaning-
ful at all the stream of thought can be only a stream for that which is 
not a stream. The consciousness in which identity resides must com-
prise the states in its own unity; it must distinguish itself from them 
as their abiding subject. 3 As Professor Brightman, in his criticism 
of this view, indicated it "saved the soul and the law of continuit)C •• but 
at considerable expense to other intellectual demands, particularly to 
the demand for clear definition. " 4 Brightman goes on to ask the de-
structive question, "What is the soul of which so much is said?" And 
he answers, 
It is "that which" has consciousness, "that which" is con-
tinually existing even when we are unconscious, "that 
which" has faculties •••• It is a very abstract sort. of es-
sence; indeed, one can hardly attach any positive mean-
ing whatever to the word soul when used in this sense. 5 
1. Bowne, MET, 316. 4. Brightman, IP, 175. 
2. Ibid., 340. 5. Loc. cit. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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The alternative which Bowne's followers, notably Brightman 
and Peter A. Bertocci, would offer to the outmoded soul psychology 
may be called the doctrine of the self. The self or consciousness may 
be described as Bertocci sees it--the one existent, on going, unified, 
sensing, thinking, wanting, imagining, willing, oughting, being, which 
is not an underlying subject with these activities as properties but is 
the activity itself. 1 
A person is the unified experiences of sensing, remembering, 
imagining, perceiving, jud2ing, or thinking, feeling, emot-
ing, oughting, and willing. 
Brightman makes essentially the same modification in his contention 
that, 
A self is any conscious experience or process taken as 
a whole and as experiencing itself. The "soul" was the 
hypostatization of this "wholeness"; but since the self 
is a concrete conscious reality, why push the soul off 
into the realm of the unknowable. 3 
The essence of the new self psychology, which may well answer 
some of the problematic quandaries of Bowne's soul psychology, is the 
assertion that all conscious experience may influence the self in vary-
ing degrees, but if consciousness means anything, it is absurd to claim 
that what is not experienced by consciousness is a part of it. Since we 
1. Bertocci, IPR, 203. 
2 . Ibid . , 2 04. 
3 . Brightman, IP, 191, note that this might serve also as a criticism of 
Wild 1s psyche. 
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do not experience our sub-conscious, environment or a sub-stratum soul 
we refer to these things, on Brightman's view, as other than our self-
. 1 
exper1ence . 
Because there are several variations of the idealistic metaphysics, 
as there are many articulations of any system, Bowne has sometimes 
been criticized by metaphysical realists for the sins of another school 
of philosophy toward which Bowne himself would manifest abhorrence. 
Bowne did not call his system of metaphysics Berkeleyanism, alone, but 
rather Kantianized-Berkeleyanism, 2 and it must be admitted, that to 
some extent, this needs still further modification. In spite of Bowne's. 
precautions however, the charges so often levelled against Berkeley, 
and others of his persuasion, often find a target for their accusations 
in Bowne. Nor is he wholly excusable from the responsibility of being 
at least partly at fault for the misconception which gives rise to this at-
tack. 
To indicate the problem in a specific setting consideration must 
be given to Bowne's own claim that in knowledge mind makes its object. 
That is to say that all objects of mind owe their existence to mind. Berkeley's 
claim, ~est percipi, can be seen to express Bowne' .s view also. But 
here Bowne would rebel insisting that only in a narrow sense is that 
1. Brightman, IP, 200-201. 
2. Bowne, TTK, 50. 
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interpretation correct. While admitting that the world of things which 
is in space has its existence only in intelligence he would also assert 
that this world of our perception is phenomenal and depends for its 
phenomenal appearance in part upon our perception, but for its ultimate 
d h . . 11 . 1 existence and causal groun upon t e cosm1c 1nte 1gence. 
Those who accuse Bowne of the Berkeleyan dilemma2 at the above 
point do so on the basis of his quite inadequate expl anation of the di£-
ference between the phenomenal and the metaphysical object. His 
failure to account clearly for the givenness or brute fact of the activity 
of being which comprises objects has been corrected in his followers. 
Bertocci makes a distinction between what he calls the epistemological 
and metaphysical objects, which distinction Bowne would in all proba-
bility, consent to as rendering his entire position more intelligible. 
Bertocci3 sees the epistemological object as a joint-product of the creative 
knower and of the metaphysical agent. The metaphysical object or brute 
fact of givenness which will be called x produces in the knowing being altera .,. 
tions in its nature consistent with its nature, that is, the complex unity 
of knowing-appreciating. Accordingly when x interacts with the knowing 
person, whatever its sublimal and other affects upon his total nature, it 
I. Bowne, TTK, 342. 
2. A dilemma, in fact, from which Berkeley himself escaped by a similar 
method. 
3. In a paper read before the American Metaphysical Society on March 19, 
1954. 
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is responded to cognitively. In other words the epistemological object, 
which depends for its being upon the mind or the self experiencing it, is 
a joint product of three sets of events: {1) the nature of his own being 
including his cognitive act, (2) the factors outside him in x, and (3) what-
ever media may exist between the cognitive effect in him as knower and 
the stimulating situation (the x situation). 1 
To the above descriptive analysis Bowne would probably give agree-
ment, but since he failed to articulate the details in so precise a manner 
he is sometimes accused of having no x or metaphysical object apart from 
the individual mind's activity; while the truth is that, for Bowne, our 
knowledge of objects is our own product, but the ultimate object to 
which our knowledge refers is not our own product. 
2. COMPARATIVE--In seeking to discover instances of similarity and 
difference among the three philosophers under question there are three 
major elements of the knowledge process to be held in focus. For any 
meaningful discussion to be engaged in, relative to the epistemological 
possibilities of experience; these three factors must be alluded to in some 
form or other, regardless of the definition or scope of activity one might 
assign them. The elements then which constitute the sine qua~ of any 
theory of knowledge are the knowing agent or per son or mind, the known 
1. From Bertocci 's paper. 
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fact or object or appearance, and whatever relationship which by its 
presence renders the first two factors relevant to each other. The three 
men investigated would have no quarrel with the insistence that these 
three factors are at least unavoidable problems for their respective 
theories. 
A. NATURE OF MIND- -That there exists a knowing faculty of some 
sort we can entertain no doubt, for in the doubting we employ the doubted 
which leads to a contradiction of the assertion. This makes no claim 
however that for all men;through all time the term mind has meant pre-
cisely the same thing. Qu,ite to the contrary, many battles have been 
fought over just what the nature of the cognitive faculty should be inter-
preted as. 
For Professor Wild the mind, IDll" psyche as he would prefer to 
have it called, is the form of the matter which is in this case body. 
Form is taken by Wild in the Aristotelian sense involving first cause 
and hylomorphic being. Not merely the shape in an extended particular 
instance, but with the inclusion of Aristotle's notion of purposive "what-
ness", a picture may be had indicative of the noetic subject. On Wild's 
view every individual has two aspects: matter and form, and either with-
out the other is an abstraction. Each individual particular has properties 
which make it what it is, and these it shares with other things so that 
ll7 
form is universal inhering in all particulars. Every individual thing is 
also just this particular thing .and not another thing {thisness). 1 
Mind is set off from its acts, that is, it is not exhausted in its 
acts, but neither could it be the producer of them without faculty mediation. 
No more could mind or body exist independently than could form or mat-
ter for Wild. Does this imply that mind is merely the body in a particu-
lar function; that the two are identical in a manner similar to Alexander's 
view of brain as mind? Some have charged that Wild is shut up to this 
conclusion . . He admits that it is absurd to talk of them as in any sense 
distinct or existing independently insisting that we have but to see that 
mind is the form of body, that which makes human life possible. In 
discussion, however, Wild admits that to fuse mind and body destroys 
the prinCiple of individuation to which he desires to .hold. 
Alexander is willing to go the logical step which identifies mind 
with brain or neural process, and sees mental activity as a quality pro-
duced by a complex of nervous organization in a certain condition of 
functioning. Alexander traces mind to a function of the brain which enters 
actively into the cognitive relation. Mind has emerged in the order of 
evolutionary development as the highest quality which we experience, but 
it has its empirical beginnings in the same spatia-temporal matrix from 
whence emerged material things, secondary and primary qualities and 
all the rest of finite existents. While every psychosis is also a neurosis, 
mind is not merely life on Alexander's view since real novelty is asserted 
1. Jones, HWP, 185-86. 
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to occur at each level. 
Bowne views mind as the self, subject of mental life, active 
and creative in knowing. Mental life is neither deducible from physi-
cal process, nor explainable in terms of lower stages of devdopment, 
nor ultimately dependent upon the physical organism, for Bowne. On 
the other hand, Alexander and Wild would refuse to mind the creative 
activity which Bowne ascribes to it. On all three views mind is active 
but inincreasingly less autonomous degrees. For Bowne mind actively 
reconstructs the raw material afforded by the natural world and, in so 
doing, creates, in a real sense, the object of knowledge. Wild would 
admit mind is ever active and on the prowl illuminating and abstracting 
universal forms for noetic identification. 
Alexander holds that "a mental act is only a salient and interesting 
act which stands out in the whole mental condition. 111 For him the act 
is one in a continuum of mental acts or states within one unitary condi-
tion; e. g. the perception in central focus with its peripheral accompani-
ments. More elaboration concerning the activity of mind belongs under 
the final section on the cognitive relation. What should be made clear 
about the actual nature of the knowing faculty is an apparent irreconcilable 
difference obtaining among the three views or at least between two bas-
ically differing views. Bowne finds a clue to the reality of nature in his 
1. Alexander, STD, I, 13. 
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conception of mind which Wild and Alexander would not confirm on 
their views. 
B. NATURE OF OBJECT--Wild has a hylornorphic universe not only 
on the level of mind but pervading physical existence as well. Things 
are corn binations of a substrate matter with a particular form existing 
in a real world, and are apprehended by mind which is in all ways dis-
tinct from them, at least until it enters into formal identity in the cog-
nitive relation. The notion of being is fundamental and applies to all ex-
istences both material and immaterial which are the constitutive features 
of the cosmos. The objects of knowledge are "real, substantial entities 
existing in themselves and ordered to one another by real, extrarnental 
relations. " 1 
For Alexander things are complexes of Space- Time, the universal 
matrix of all emergent existences, and occupy a position secondary to 
that of mind only by virtue of their antecedence in emergence. In the 
formation of physical objects real space and real time unite in the pre-
cipitation of motion of a certain kind determining the precise nature of 
the object. Whenever a group of point-instants reaches a certain com-
plexity of motion a new quality is ern erged. This emergence of new 
qualities accounts for our world of things, life, sentience, and mental 
1. Wild, RTR, 357. 
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processes, peculiar to humans; each explainable in terms of lower 
complexes but each having its distinct higher quality. 
Bowne's postulation of a cosmic intelligence commits him to a 
conception of a world of continuous existence in and for this intelli-
gence. The world of existents may be independent from finite thought 
but not from all thought since the active will of the cosmic mind causes 
all existence. It has been seen that thi~gs are "concreted formulas of 
action" for Bowne. That is, being, interpreted as activity, 1 is struc-
tured according to law so that the nature of a thing is seen to be that 
law or principle which determines the form and character of its activity. 
In the phenomenal world, however, (and this is the only world we know)2 
before the object becomes truly an object of knowledge it has been re-
constructed by mind through the forms of the sensibilities and the cate-
gories of thought that it might be meaningful for finite intelligence. The 
thing-in-itself, if there be such, never enters into cognitive experience 
on Bowne's views; but that it can be and must be is a fundamental tenet 
of most realistic positions. 3 
C. THE COGNITIVE RELATION--In regard to the differences in con-
ceiving the elements of the cognitive relation we find the following. 
1. Bowne, MET, chap. II. 
2 . Ibid., 144. 
3. Although critical realists as a whole would agree with Bowne that 
reality can be 'thought about 1 • 
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1. Relation- -For Wild the relation is one of identity between the 
form of the object and m:j.nd, mediated by the faculties. 
This is not to be thought of as existential identity but 
noetic or formal identity in the experience of knowing 
the object as it really is. 
For Alexander the relation is one of compresence, 
the simplest of all relations. It is not unique except as 
one of the terms is unique. The actual process bears 
close resemblance to Wild's identity. To know anything 
is to be along with it in Space-Time. He often appears 
to portray an active sensum provoking mental process 
to attention, that is, the compresent object evokes the 
mental act by a causal action. 1 The relation of cogni-
tion is, on Alexander's view, the deliverance of direct 
experience. 2 In every act of cognition two separate enti-
ties or finites are in compresence, the one an enjoyment, 
the other what in relation to the enjoyment is a contem-
plated object. 3 
The relation on Bowne 1s view is the reconstruction by 
the finite mind of the fact which is willed by the cosmic 
1. Alexander, STD, II, 83. 
2. Ibid., 87. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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· intelligence. Mind is active and creative. It does not 
grasp, assimilate or photograph the object. It knows 
the object. The object can-not be known as it is 1 1 but only 
as it is something for intelligence. 
2. Error--Wi~d accounts for error by the sensory cognitive level 
confusion of irrelevant ·material or irrelevant inclusion 
1. Ibid., 184. 
of improperly abstracted material by the intellect. 
Alexander classifies error under the heading either of 
mere appearances, · illusory appearances or illusions which 
are caused through mind's activity in improper synthesis 
or partial revelatio~ cif objects. The appearances which do 
not belong to the thing itself arise from the combination of 
the thing with other things, or from the intrusion of the 
mind of the observer into the observation. 1 
The undeniable fact of the existence of error presents 
Bowne 1 s phenomenalism with its impetus for refusing the 
solution offered by the two other thinkers. Error proves 
at least that our idea is not always identical with the object 
for were it so we should have no illusion or misjudgment. 
The asserted finitude of the human mind qualitatively dis-
tinct from the cosmic intellect is unable to act in precisely 
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the same manner and with precisely the same results as 
the cosmic mind does. We think the brute fact of exis-
tence into an object for ourselves: God thinks and wills 
into existence whatever cosmos there be. 
3. Dualism or Monism--Wild's theory is radically opposed to the 
monistic view that the species by which we know is the 
object which we know, that knowledge involves a sheer 
identity with no aspect of diversity . His view is opposed, 
on the other hand, to the dualistic tenet that the species 
by which we know is not formally identical with the object 
in knowledge, that knowledge involves a sheer diversity 
with no aspect of identity. 1 Emphasis upon reference and 
independence of thought from object indicates at least 
existential dualism. 
Alexander makes the claim that every conscious pro-
cess refers to an object other than the mental process it-
2 
:s:elf. He also states that the object is an existence dis-
tinct from mind and only selected by it so that there is 
nothing in the mind but acts. 3 Again he insists that the en-
joyment of the mind 1.s self is at the same time the contem-
plation of an object distinct from it and non-mental. 4 All 
1. Wild, RTR, 360. 3. Ibid., 148. 
2. Alexander, STD, II, 15. 4. Ibid. , 87. 
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of this speaks clearly in dualistic tones, yet Alexander 
has said enough to the contrary to bring this observa-
tion from Ledger Wood. 
His realism, despite his admission of the inner 
duality of consciousness and its object, is episte-
mologically monistic: he considers all sense 
qualities as inherent in the object contemplated by 
·the mind:; the content and the objects of knowledge are 
completely identified. 1 
The apparent difficulty in Wood's understanding of Alex-
ander at this point concerns a confusion of metaphysical 
with epistemological monism. Alexander's dualism stands. 
While he does insist that content and object are identified, 
he does not say they are identical with the knowing sub-
ject. For Alexander objective reference, what he calls 
a knowing "of" is always pre sent in contemplation. The 
contemplating does not become the contemplated on his 
view . 
. However Alexander does speak of direct experie~ 
in what might be a confusing manner. Two possible sources 
of the confusion are found in his meaning of "experience" 
and his scant treatment of "assurance". He sometimes 
uses experience in the broadesisense which would be accepted 
even by Bowne. At other times he restricts experience to 
be identical with cognition. 2 The direct experience or direct 
1. In Ferro, HPS, 523. 
2. STD, I, 4, 5. 
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cognition which we have of other minds arises because 
of the emotion of sociality excited by reciprocal response. 
But although we have direct experience of the existence 
of minds in others, such experience is not knowledge 
derived from contemplation of external objects or enjoyment 
of ourselves. 1 The experience is direct in that it is not 
inferential. In our emotional response we are aware of 
· another mind directly and then ''divine" by analogy of what 
sort it is. 
Part of Wood's difficulty here might arise from the 
same source as a similar one in W ild's noetic identity. 
The identity in Alexander would be between sensa and 
mental process which rriay have no affect upon the exis-
tential reality of the object, while on Wild 1 s view the ob-
jec tive material reality of the object is not affected by the 
formal assimilation by mind in cognition . 
Whether Bowne's epistemology is monistic or dualistic 
creates a similar problem as did the two former instances. 
He insists in a dualism of thought and thing from the human 
standpoint. In the experience of the cosmic mind, however, 
there could be no such distinction. The fact of objective 
reference which finds expression in all three theories is 
meaningless unless the object is distinct from the referent 
1. STD, II, chap. 1, B. 
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in some sense. Whether it is independent of thought is 
another question. Independence defined as separate 
from the act of awareness is one thing, and independence 
defined as in no way affected by the act of awareness is 
another. To the first definition Bowne and Wild would 
agree and Alexander would also admit to an inner duality. 
The second meaning brings protest from Bowne while 
finding support in Alexander and particularly in Wild. 
3. CONCLUSION--When defenders of opposing views se.ek possibilities 
of reconciliation on the ground of mutuality in certain major aspects of 
their individual theories an encouraging atmosphere is created. It may 
be that individuals are sufficiently unique so that a complete agreement 
is beyond expectation. The following abbreviated statement of Wild's 
latest thinking has much which would be of merit to Alex;ander and Bowne. 
A form is received by matter subjectively comprising a new com-
posite physical entity. A form is received objectively or intentionally 
by mind and comes into noetic existence without constituting any new 
composite entity. By this means a form may be physically pre sent with-
out being noetically present, and vice versa. This forbids the making or 
constructing of anything new in knowledge and allows only the assimilation 
l'T 
1 27 
of a determinate form already in act. The mind is formally identical 
with but existentially diverse from that which it knows. The existen-
tial diversity creates a knowledge relation as one of unique intentional 
identity. 
Alexander denies the unique relation and would modify the view 
substantially with a doctrine of sensa. He would affirm however the dir-
ectness of cognition. 
Bowne would be irritated only by the_ failure of the elaboration to 
distinguish between the object known and the known object. Bowne might 
admit that we are identical with the known object, however he would not 
concede that it is nothing new; rather it is a construct dependent upon 
mind's activity and content. 
The views maintain a basic incongruity because of this stubborn 
insistence upon a varying empirical interpretation. Which is right can-
not be decided here nor perhaps elsewhere, but the object of this study 
was not to settle for all time the epistemological issues of the ages. 
Such a dream is ambitious but undoubtedly fatuous. The most coherent 
view must be the property of those to whom coherence is a treasured 
measure of truth. Perhaps the hope of philosophy as expressed in the 
program of six realists will continue to burn until minor discrepancies 
are sacrificed in the larger interest of progress. 
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By conferring on other topics, by interchange of ideas, 
and by systematic criticism of one another 1 s phraseology, 
methods, and hypotheses, we hope to develop a common 
technique, a common terminology, and so finally a common 
doctrine which will enjoy some measure of that authority 
which the natural sciences possess.l 
1. Holt, et al "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists 11 , quoted 
in Jarrett and McMurran, (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy. 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem of this thesis is to consider the epistemological theories 
of three modern thinkers, John Wild, Samuel Alexander, and Borden 
Parker Bowne, in regard to their evaluation of what knowing essentially 
is. The writer's purpose in pursuing this study is to discover whether 
these three realistic theories are as widely divergent as might appear to 
be the case. 
The method followed is one of internal criticism based first on a 
sympathetic exposition of the views being considered, then criticism and 
comparison, and finally whatever conclusions can be inferred from such 
consideration. 
It was discovered that for John Wild, a direct realist, to know means 
to know something exactly as it is formally, apart from knowledge. Mere 
similarity will not suffice if knowledge is to be meaningful, there must be 
identity between what is in mind and what is in the object. This noetic 
identity involves a mode of assimilation which is non-composite, non-
physical and immaterial in nature. Wild illustrates his position by use 
of an analogy in which the mind is seen to follow the operation of a flash 
camera and the resultant photographic process. 
For Samuel Alexander, a naturalistic realist, theory of knowledge 
is not thought to be the essential concern of metaphysics, but only an important 
chapter in it. It is to this chapter that greatest attention has been given 
in this thesis. Mind was found to be in dynamic relation to the living 
organism which it occupies ,. and from which it emerges . Rather than 
unique, in the strict sense of that term, the cognitive relation is but an 
outstanding instance of a relation which can be appropriately expressed 
on any level of emergence. Alexander finds no discontinuity between 
mind and body in that mental process is also neural process- in an all-
embracing inter - relationship of the organism as a whole. 
In mind's activity there were discovered three main types of ex-
perience on Alexander's view, each distinguished by the nature of that which 
is experienced. These forms of cognitive experience were seen to be, 
first, contemplation of external things, further described as activity of 
mind, second, assurance of other minds and of God; and finally, enjoyment 
of one's own mind in its contemplation, assurance and enjoyment. 
The transcendental realism of B. P. Bowne is set in an idealistic 
metaphysical framework. The mind was seen to be active in knowing on 
Bowne's view. "Thought first goes straight to things . II Objects cannot 
pass bodily into consciousness, nor can consciousness expand itself and 
engulf the existing object. The mind, Bowne taught, can do nothing but 
think, and the object can do nothing but be. Still Bowne admitted the two 
terms must be brought together. This is to be accomplished only by 
thinking the cosmic order and reconstructing it in thought. However 
real or ideal the world may be, on Bowne's view, it becomes an object 
for us only as mind builds up in consciousness a system of conceptions, 
and relates their contents under the various forms of intelligence. 
In comparison of the three philosophers being studied attention 
was given to their respective theories concerning the nature of the mind 
or knowing subject, the nature of the object known, and the relationship 
obtaining between them. It was discovered that on Wild's view the mind 
or psyche corresponds to the Aristotelian notion of form which gives 
determinate structure to matter. Wild does not however fuse mind and 
body. Alexander makes no hesitancy in proclaiming that mental processes 
are neural process, but seems at the same time to want "something more" 
in mentality. For Bowne the mind or self was neitrer deducible from~ nor 
explainable in terms of,physical process. 
The object of knowledge varies for the three thinkers in respect 
to its nature. Wild sees it, in his hylomorphic universe, as a real sub-
stantial entity existing in itself and ordered to other entities by real, extra-
mental relations. For Alexander things are complexes of Space-Time, and 
occupy a position secondary to that of mind only by virtue of their ante-
cedence in emergence. The insistence of Alexander that "bare" Space- Time 
comprises all there is in the world and in mind was found to be a contradiction 
with his whole endeavor which brings from this "empty matrix" all the 
world of existents. Bowne's postulation of a cosmic intelligence commits 
him to a conception of a world of continuous existence in and for this in-
telligence. The world of existents may be independent from finite thought 
but not from all thought since the active will of the cosmic mind causes 
all existence. 
The cognitive relation is seen by Wild to be one of noetic identity, for 
Alexander one of compresence, and for Bowne a reconstruction by the finite 
mind of the willed fact of the cosmic intelligence. Are the three thinkers 
then to be conceived as epistemic monists or dualists? There were de-
tected emphases to indicate both positions in all three views. Each man 
spoke of objective reference which seems to necessitate an existential 
dualism. Wild holds to a noetic identity or direct experience of the real 
object. Alexander would have to admit that ultimately the sensa are re-
ceived by the mind. Bowne's reconstituted or reconstructed object is cer-
tainly "in" the mind. Traditionally speaking the three views could be clas si-
fied as dualistic, with Wild presenting the greatest difficulty especially in 
the noetic moment. 
The question as to whether or not these views are of nature irrecon-
cilable was asked and, even when the greatest attempt to find a basis of 
compatibility was made, the answer was yes. The nature of the object 
15 1 
was found to be different on each theory as was the cognitive relation. 
The three philosophers dealt with in this thesis were found to present 
at least two distinctly and fundamentally divergent conceptions of the 
knowledge experience. 
